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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
The Amazon rainforest is the largest moist tropical forest in the world, covering
over 5.4 million km2 in 2001, an area almost half the size of the United States.1 Since its
beginnings during the Cretaceous period, the Amazon has provided a host of ecological
services both regionally and globally. The Amazon is a bastion of biodiversity; roughly a
quarter of the total known terrestrial animal species in the world live within its
boundaries, and many more remain undiscovered.2 Nutrient cycling by Amazonian plants
enhances agricultural productivity,3 and recent research indicates that the ecosystems of
the Amazon Basin play a major role in regulating local and global climate patterns.
Particularly important is transpiration, the process whereby trees convey water from up
to 10 m beneath the ground to their leaves, where it is released into the atmosphere. In
this way, approximately 25-50% of the water of the Amazon Basin is recycled.4 When
areas are deforested, local weather shows a marked decrease in precipitation, especially
during the dry season.5 Without the Amazon’s presence to maintain moisture in the
atmosphere, rain patterns throughout nearby areas of South America would lose a major
buffer against drought in drier years. At the global scale, the Amazon serves as a net

1

Yadvinder Malhi et al., "Climate Change, Deforestation, and the Fate of the Amazon," Science
319, no. 169 (January, 2008), 169.
2
Ibid., 169
3
Philip M. Fearnside, "Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazonia: History, Rates, and Consequences,"
Conservation Biology 19, no. 3 (June, 2005), 683. Jonathan A. Foley et al., "Amazonia Revealed:
Forest Degradation and Loss of Ecosystem Goods and Services in the Amazon Basin," Frontiers in
Ecology and the Environment 5, no. 1 (February, 2007), 25.
4

Malhi et al., Climate Change, Deforestation, and the Fate of the Amazon, 169
Carlos A. Nobre, Piers J. Sellers, and Jagadish Shukla, "Amazonian Deforestation and Regional
Climate Change," Journal of Climate 4 (October, 1991), 969.
5
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carbon sink, making it a key resource in any long-term plan to combat human-driven
climate change.6
Despite the myriad of ecosystem services provided by the Amazon, it was not
recognized as an asset by the countries in which it lies for many decades. Beginning in
the 1970s, the rate of deforestation in the Amazon increased greatly, especially in Brazil,
where an average of 18,500 km2 per year was deforested every year from 1988-2005,
representing 80% of the total Amazonian deforestation during this time period.7 This
destruction resulted in significant releases of carbon, with recent estimates suggesting
that deforestation in Brazil during the 1980s and 1990s accounted for a net emission of
approximately 0.2 petagrams (Pg) of carbon per year. When compared to the total
amount of carbon released by deforestation in the tropics worldwide, which was around
0.75 Pg per year, the scale of impact on global climate becomes clearer: deforestation in
the Amazon represented almost 5% of annual global carbon emissions during this
period. 8
As a result of the many ecosystem services it provides, the issue of deforestation
in the Amazon is of enormous concern. Because Brazil has had the highest rate of
deforestation of all Amazonian countries in the past few decades, international and
domestic concern has led its government to seek strategies to reduce the problem.

6

Malhi et al., Climate Change, Deforestation, and the Fate of the Amazon, 169
"Project PRODES," Brazilian National Institute for Space Research,
http://www.obt.inpe.br/prodes/index.html (accessed October 30, 2012, 2011).; Malhi et al., Climate
Change, Deforestation, and the Fate of the Amazon, 169
8
Ruth S. DeFries et al., "Carbon Emissions from Tropical Deforestation and Regrowth Based on
Satellite Observations for the 1980s and 1990s," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
99, no. 22 (October, 2002), 14258-14259.
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These efforts have been impressively effective in recent years, with only 6,200 km2 of
deforestation detected in 2011.9 Though this is a significant reduction from the levels of
the 1990s, it still represents the annual loss of an area of forest the size of Delaware. In
addition, these figures do not capture the impacts of forest degradation caused by
selective logging and overhunting of threatened species.10 Though it is difficult to detect,
degradation can have far-reaching impacts; for instance, selective logging can lead to up
to 40% mortality of surrounding vegetation, and often results in the complete
eradication of keystone species from an ecosystem.11 Both the continued rate of
deforestation and the unbridled degradation of the Amazon point to the need for
innovative strategies for its protection.
One major approach to conservation has been to establish protected areas with
limitations on the amount or type of resource extraction which can take place within
their boundaries. In 2000, the Brazilian government implemented the National System of
Conservation Units (Sistema Nacional de Unidades de Conservação da Natureza, SNUC)
to consolidate and standardize regulation regarding previously-establish protected
areas.12 The SNUC divides protected areas into two broad categories: integral protection
(proteção integral), and sustainable use (uso sustentável). Integral protection areas
include biological reserves, ecological stations, natural monuments, and wildlife refuges,

9

Project PRODES
Foley et al., Amazonia Revealed: Forest Degradation and Loss of Ecosystem Goods and Services in
the Amazon Basin, 26-27
11
Joyotee Smith et al., "Dynamics of the Agricultural Frontier in the Amazon and Savannas of
Brazil: Analyzing the Impact of Policy and Technology," Environmental Modeling and Assessment 3
(1998), 33.
12
M. A. Pedlowski et al., "Conservation Units: A New Deforestation Frontier in the Amazonian
State of Rondônia, Brazil," Environmental Conservation 32, no. 2 (2005), 150.
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and are characterized by little or no allowed human development within their territory.
Sustainable use areas include extractive reserves and sustainable development reserves,
and generally allow a limited amount of farming, logging, or other sustainable economic
activities.13
Major efforts by the Brazilian government to increase the number of conservation
units (unidades de conservação, CUs) have been very successful during the last few
decades, with a significant increase in both integral protection and sustainable use CUs
at the federal and state level.14 However, beginning in the early 1990s, municipal leaders
began to complain about this increase, stating that the requirement to maintain federal
lands within their borders carried a high opportunity cost, preventing those lands form
being used for more lucrative alternative activities.15 This is a particularly important
consideration in Brazil because of the way the tax structure is organized by the Federal
Constitution of 1988. The main source of tax funds for states and municipalities is the Tax
on Circulation of Goods and Services (Imposto sobre a Circulação de Mercadorias e
Prestação de Serviços de Transporte Interestadual e Intermunicipal e de Comunicação,
ICMS), a value-added tax collected by the state governments. According to the
Constitution, 25% of the total funds collected at the state level must be redistributed to
municipality governments and 75% of the funds that pass to municipalities must be

13

Normative Instruction no. 1 of May 5, 2010: State of Mato Grosso.
Russell A. Mittermeier et al., "A Brief History of Biodiversity Conservation in Brazil," Conservation
Biology 19, no. 3 (June, 2005), 601-603.
15
Maryanne Grieg-Gran, Fiscal Incentives for Biodiversity Conservation: The ICMS Ecológico in
Brazil (London, UK: International Institute for Environment and Development: Environmental
Economics Programme, 2000), 1.
14

8

distributed according to where they were collected;16 therefore, the ability of
municipalities to maintain functioning industries is vital to their incoming revenues.
However, with the right state policies, this rigid tax structure has proven to be not
a barrier to the establishment of CUs, but a tool for their expansion. The opportunity lies
in the fact that the remaining 25% of funds transferred from states to municipalities can
be distributed according to any criteria chosen by the state. In 1991, the state of Paraná
was the first to establish an ecological-based criterion for distribution of its ICMS funds.17
Five percent of the total funds given to municipalities was to be determined by the area
of protected land within each municipality; the more protected area, the greater a
municipality’s share of the 5%. This innovative idea quickly spread, and as of 2012,
fourteen of Brazil’s 27 states have adopted some form of ecological ICMS (ICMS-e)
criteria.18
While the ICMS-e has spread rapidly and is quite popular, few definitive efforts
have been made to assess its effectiveness. Clearly, the inclusion of an ecological
criterion will benefit municipalities which already maintain protected areas within their
borders. However, one of the stated goals of the ICMS-e is to incentivize municipalities
to create new protected areas. While the number and area of CUs has grown
substantially during the same time period in which the ICMS-e has been implemented,

16

Further details regarding the structure and functioning of the ICMS are presented in Chapter II.
Ibid., 1
17
Vinicius Duarte Ribeiro, "Ecological ICMS as an Instrument of Forest Policy" (Forestry Engineer,
Federal Rural University of Rio De Janiero, 2008), 6-7,
http://www.icmsecologico.org.br/images/artigos/a010.pdf (accessed November 27, 2011).
18
"Ecological ICMS," The Nature Conservancy, http://www.icmsecologico.org.br/ (accessed
October 27, 2011).
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this is unsurprising; CUs are, with very few exceptions, permanently designated, so it is
impossible for their extent to decrease.19 In this case, simple correlation should not be
taken as a sign that the ICMS-e is having its intended effect without further evidence
directly linking its presence to the growth of protected areas.
Because of the popularity of the ICMS-e as a conservation tool, it is extremely
important that its be assessed using a systematic, quantified method, something which
has not been previously done. This study attempts to do just that by using econometric
analysis of panel data of 807 municipalities within the states of the Legal Amazon
(Amazônia Legal) to assess whether the presence of the ICMS-e had a significant effect
on the increase in the number of protected areas during the period from 1999-2009.

19

Ibid.; Pedlowski et al., Conservation Units: A New Deforestation Frontier in the Amazonian State
of Rondônia, Brazil, 150
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CHAPTER II. HISTORICAL AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND
History of Deforestation in the Amazon
Up until the 20th century, the Amazon was ignored by the Brazilian government –
it was viewed as a forbidding jungle, impassable except through major waterways, and
inhabited by unfriendly indigenous groups, dangerous animals, and diseases. For the
most part, human settlement during the colonial period occupied only areas along
Brazil’s Atlantic coastline. These areas experienced significant environmental impacts –
the important Atlantic Forest ecosystem today only covers a mere 12% of its original
extent.20 However, the inland forests of the Amazon Basin escaped this devastation.
Though there was some deforestation along the outer edges of the Amazon, the vast
majority of the forest remained intact, with only 0.6% of the original extent deforested in
1975.21 This started to change during the 1970s, when Brazil’s military government began
to be concerned about securing its western borders. As a result, many programs were
initiated to improve transportation and communication across the Amazon, to increase
economic development within the Amazon, and to make greater use of the “wasted”

20

Milton Cezar Ribeiro et al., "The Brazilian Atlantic Forest: How Much is Left, and how is the
Remaining Forest Distributed? Implications for Conservation," Biological Conservation 142, no. 6
(2009), 1145.
21
Emilio F. Moran, "Deforestation and Land use in the Brazilian Amazon," Human Ecology 21, no. 1
(1993), 1.
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forest resources.22 All these programs led to an exponential increase in the amount of
deforestation; by 2003, 16.2% of the Amazon’s original extent was gone (Figure 1).23
Figure 1. Annual Deforestation Rate and Cumulative Deforestation in the Amazon, 1978-
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Data Sources: 1977-1987: Fearnside, “Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazonia,” 681. 1988-2011:
INPE, Project PRODES.

Vital to the rise in deforestation in the Amazon was the building of roads which
enabled access to deeper reaches of the forest. Almost all studies of the causes of
deforestation worldwide point to the presence of roads as a significant contributing
factor, and the Amazon is no exception.24 Without roads, logging is prohibitively
expensive due to transportation costs, farmers and ranchers cannot easily claim land, and
22

Onil Banerjee, Alexander J. Macpherson, and Janaki Alavalapati, "Toward a Policy of Sustainable
Forest Management in Brazil: A Historical Analysis," The Journal of Environmental Development 18
(2009), 133-134.
23
Philip M. Fearnside, "Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazonia: History, Rates, and
Consequences," Conservation Biology 19, no. 3 (June, 2005), 681.
24
Andrea Cattaneo, "Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon: Comparing the Impacts of
Macroeconomic Shocks, Land Tenure, and Technological Change," Land Economics 77, no. 2 (May,
2001), 229-230.
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settlers have little desire to establish themselves in locations far removed from cities and
towns. The Transamazon highway, which runs east-west, and the Cuiabá-Santarem
highway, which runs north-south, were built through the heart of the Amazon in the
early 1970s as part of the military government’s effort to connect the forest with the rest
of Brazil. These highways, as well as the many feeder roads leading from them, gave
ranchers, farmers, landless settlers, and loggers access to a greater area, and where road
building occurred, massive deforestation followed.25 The majority of historical
deforestation is concentrated in the “Arc of Deforestation” along the southern and
eastern edges of the Amazon, and along major roads and waterways (Figure 2). These
patterns illustrate the importance of accessibility in determining where deforestation
happens. No matter what other policies or incentives are in place, without access, it is
almost impossible to clear land.

25

Moran, Deforestation and Land use in the Brazilian Amazon, 3-5
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Figure 2. Historical deforestation and existing land use cover in the Amazon

Data Source: INPE, Project PRODES. Note: Some areas have no data because they had significant
cloud cover in satellite imagery, prohibiting land use classification.

Macroeconomic drivers of deforestation
In 1966, the federal government launched an extensive program under the
direction of the Superintendency of Development for the Amazon (Superintendência de
Desenvolvimento da Amazônia, SUDAM) with the stated goal of encouraging economic
investment in Amazonia. SUDAM provided huge tax credits to investors, often at
negative real rates of interest (between –25% to –35% from 1979-1986).26 While

26

Ibid., 5-6; Joyotee Smith et al., "Dynamics of the Agricultural Frontier in the Amazon and
Savannas of Brazil: Analyzing the Impact of Policy and Technology," Environmental Modeling and
Assessment 3 (1998), 33. Ibid. Moran, Deforestation and Land use in the Brazilian Amazon, 1-21

14

theoretically intended to help landless farmers, SUDAM’s subsidy and credit programs
were extremely corrupt. Recent investigations have found strong evidence that the
majority of credit went primarily to rich outside investors.27 Approved projects could be
used to write off 50% of personal and corporate income taxes, which, combined with
large subsidies, made investment in the Amazon massively profitable. The majority of
SUDAM-financed projects were cattle ranches, which generally practiced unsustainable
extensive land use and overgrazing.28 A ban on the international export of Brazilian beef
due to hoof-and-mouth disease meant that most of these ranches were not profitable
without the extensive subsidies they enjoyed. In the late 1980s, beef prices began to rise,
and the lifting of the export ban in 2002 helped to make ranching profitable without
extensive subsidies.29 Today, cattle ranching is still a major cause of forest clearing in the
Amazon.
Brazil’s problematic economy during the 1970s and 1980s also contributed
greatly to deforestation. Massive hyperinflation during this period meant that land
speculation was extremely profitable. Poor land tenure laws categorized any clearing of
land as an “improvement,” making deforestation the easiest way to attain a high amount
of land. The returns to deforesting even just 14 hectares (ha) of land, holding in for two
to three years, and then selling it were more than four times the average wage for farm
workers in the rest of Brazil, making clearing an attractive option for the impoverished

27

Lykke E. Andersen and Eustáquio J. Reis, Deforestation, Development, and Government Policy in
the Brazilian Amazon: An Econometric Analysis (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Brazilian Applied Economic
Research Institute, 1997), 14.
28
Moran, Deforestation and Land use in the Brazilian Amazon, 6
29
Fearnside, Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazonia: History, Rates, and Consequences, 682
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seeking their fortune.30 Land acquisition feeds into itself, as the profits made from selling
the cleared land can be turned into clearing even more, creating a constantly-shifting
frontier moving deeper into the Amazon. Some suggest that many “ranches” financed by
SUDAM credit during this time had few (if any) cattle, and were actually purchased solely
for land speculation. 31
A country-wide recession during the late 1980s and early 1990s reduced funds
available for new investments, but continued hyperinflation maintained land
speculation’s importance in driving deforestation. In 1994, the Brazilian government
implemented the Real Plan (Plano Real), a drastic plan to stabilize the economy and
inflation rates, which had reached 2000% in 1993. The Real Plan froze many privatelyheld assets in Brazilian banks, de-indexed prices, and set a currency ceiling linked to the
US dollar.32 Although the Real Plan successfully reduced the profitability of deforestation
for land speculation, the resulting economic growth and expansion intensified industrial
and agricultural development in the Amazon. In 1995, the deforestation rate hit its peak
annual rate of 29,059 km2, a massive area the size of Belgium (Figure 1).33
Land tenure policies as drivers of deforestation
Brazil has been plagued by problematic land tenure policies and social inequality
since colonial Portuguese occupation. For the first half of the 20th century, land grants
were given almost exclusively to wealthy, influential individuals with the favor of the
30

Moran, Deforestation and Land use in the Brazilian Amazon, 7
Fearnside, Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazonia: History, Rates, and Consequences, 681
32
Smith et al., Dynamics of the Agricultural Frontier in the Amazon and Savannas of Brazil:
Analyzing the Impact of Policy and Technology, 34
33
"Project PRODES," Brazilian National Institute for Space Research,
http://www.obt.inpe.br/prodes/index.html (accessed October 30, 2012, 2011).
31
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current government.34 This led to huge inequalities in land ownership; in 1985, the Gini
coefficient of land ownership was 0.85, and an estimated 70% of all rural households
were landless. 35 Popular pressure on the government to provide opportunities for land
acquisition has left behind a legacy of policies which fuel violent conflict and incentivize
deforestation.
The National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform (Instituto Nacional de
Colonização e Reforma Agrária, INCRA) was established in 1971 to promote the cause of
landless settlers. In its early years, INCRA assisted with the government’s goal of
developing the Amazon by siting settlements near major highways being constructed in
the Amazon. Landless peasants could claim title to an area up to three times what they
cleared, and the expanding network of roads through the Amazon continually opened
up access to greater areas.36 The oil crises of the 1970s and a subsequent drop in
government funding brought an abrupt halt to many colonization programs, with the
ambitious goal of moving 100,000 families into the region only 6% complete.37 With
many planned roads abandoned, smallholder deforestation in the 1970s and 1980s was
concentrated in states near the edges of the Amazon, such as Rondônia and Pará. It is

34

Lee J. Alston, Gary D. Libecap, and Bernardo Mueller, "Land Reform Policies, the Sources of
Violent Conflict, and Implications for Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon," Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 39 (2000), 165.
35
The Gini coefficient measures inequality in distribution of wealth by plotting the cumulative
percentage of wealth on the cumulative percentage of the population, then calculating the area
between this line and the line of equality. A Gini of 0 indicates that all wealth is perfectly
distributed; a Gini of 1 indicates that a single individual owns all resources. Smith et al., Dynamics
of the Agricultural Frontier in the Amazon and Savannas of Brazil: Analyzing the Impact of Policy
and Technology, 33
36
Banerjee, Macpherson, and Alavalapati, Toward a Policy of Sustainable Forest Management in
Brazil: A Historical Analysis, 133; Moran, Deforestation and Land use in the Brazilian Amazon, 4-5
37
Ibid., 5
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important to that though smallholder deforestation in these states was substantial, it was
a minor factor in the Amazon as a whole during this time.38
With the opening of Brazil’s military government in 1974 to the gradual
implementation of democracy, the forces advocating land reform began to work in
earnest.39 Particularly important was the establishment of the Landless Rural Workers’
Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem-Terra, MST) in 1984. MST and
other lobby groups brought the plight of rural workers to national and international
attention and gained substantial institutional support from INCRA.40
The Federal Constitution of 1988 established many policies which would have a
huge impact on deforestation and development in the Amazon. Chief among them was
the codifying of a principle that had been in practice for some time: any government or
private land could be claimed by anyone who “improved” on it. According to the
provisions of the Constitution,
Article 189 – It is up to the Union to expropriate for social interest,
for the purpose of agrarian reform, the rural establishment which
is not fulfilling its social function…
Article 191 – The social function is fulfilled… by the following
requirements:
a) adequate and rational use;
b) adequate use of the natural resources available and
preservation of the environment;
c) observance of the dispositions which regulate labor relations;

38

Alston, Libecap, and Mueller, Land Reform Policies, the Sources of Violent Conflict, and
Implications for Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon, 164
39
Banerjee, Macpherson, and Alavalapati, Toward a Policy of Sustainable Forest Management in
Brazil: A Historical Analysis, 134
40
Alston, Libecap, and Mueller, Land Reform Policies, the Sources of Violent Conflict, and
Implications for Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon, 168
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d) exploration which favors the well-being of the proprietors and
workers.
Article 196 – One who, not being the proprietor of a rural or urban
establishment, possesses as his/her own for five uninterrupted
years, without opposition, an area not greater than fifty hectares,
making the land productive through his/her labor, or that of
his/her family, having in the land their habitation, will acquire the
property.41
Thus, in practice, a squatter can clear an area of land, live on it for five years, and then
have legal claim to it, regardless of the previous ownership status of the land. Targeted
lands typically include government-owned property and forested areas of large
landholdings, as these lands are difficult to police and rarely unmonitored. INCRA
manages the legal expropriation of occupied land, compensating the affected owners at
a level typically below market-value.42
The problem with these provisions becomes exceedingly clear when considered
along with environmental regulations which are also in place. Under legal requirements,
private landowners in the Legal Amazon are obligated to retain 80% of their property as
a “legal reserve” in its original forested state. However, the registration process is costly
and bureaucratic, and because the 80% figure represents an increase from the 50%
required by the 1965 Forest Code, many landowners are in violation of the law due to
deforestation that occurred before the change.43 As a result, few landowners register
their legal reserves, which makes these areas easy targets for squatters. In fact, even
registered areas are commonly viewed by INCRA as not being under “productive use,”
41

Ibid., 165
Ibid., 167
43
Banerjee, Macpherson, and Alavalapati, Toward a Policy of Sustainable Forest Management in
Brazil: A Historical Analysis, 132
42
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and private holdings have been ceded to squatters despite court orders for their
eviction.44 Thus, the incentive system currently in place encourages squatters to clear
land in order to claim it through expropriation by INCRA, while landowners have an
incentive to clear land to show that it is currently being put to “productive use,” thereby
protecting it from squatters. Surveys in Pará found that, when faced with the threat of
land invasion, landowners would more often clear land beyond legal allowances, even at
the risk of substantial fines.45
Uncertain land tenure in the Amazon does not just affect environmental wellbeing, but has a profound human cost as well. Unsurprisingly, relations between
landowners and squatters are often confrontational and have led to many violent
conflicts in the past few decades. In 1989 alone, an estimated 800 people were killed in
land conflicts in the Amazon.46 Tragically, this problem persists even today; as recently as
March 2012, three rural activists were gunned down in the southern state of Minas
Gerais.47 These murders are politically embarrassing to the Brazilian government, so it
typically acts decisively when it believes conflict is escalating within a region. In 2005, the
government deployed 2,000 soldiers to Pará to maintain order after a US missionary and
an MST activist were murdered there.48

44

Alston, Libecap, and Mueller, Land Reform Policies, the Sources of Violent Conflict, and
Implications for Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon, 168
45
Ibid., 170
46
Moran, Deforestation and Land use in the Brazilian Amazon, 17
47
Bradley Brooks, "Brazil Investigating Killings of 3 Rural Activists," Associated Press, March 26,
2012.
48
Banerjee, Macpherson, and Alavalapati, Toward a Policy of Sustainable Forest Management in
Brazil: A Historical Analysis, 145
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Simulations by Alston et al. found that efforts by INCRA and the federal
government to respond quickly to violence actually had the unintended consequence of
increasing the number of conflicts.49 Because INCRA has limited staff and cannot address
all squatter claims, priority typically goes to the places which receive the most public
attention, thereby encouraging squatters to instigate violence. Groups such as the MST
have used these tactics to their advantage, organizing protests and road blockades to
force INCRA to negotiate new policies to benefit landless workers.50 This suggests that
the sources of violent conflict must be addressed, rather than merely responding to
issues as they arise. Little change is likely in the current situation of conflicting policies
and uncertain land tenure.
Recent developments and the current state of deforestation
As international concern for the Amazon grew, pressure on the Brazilian
government to end problematic policies rose.51 In 1991, Brazil suspended all SUDAM tax
breaks and prohibited further credit subsidies, though any pre-existing projects
continued to receive benefits.52 Removal of major subsidies for clearing in the Amazon is
an important step, but many smaller programs still continue which create incentives for
deforestation. Agricultural credit is common in Brazil and carries strong popular support.
As in many countries, the Brazilian government will often buy crops at levels above

49

Alston, Libecap, and Mueller, Land Reform Policies, the Sources of Violent Conflict, and
Implications for Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon, 183
50
Banerjee, Macpherson, and Alavalapati, Toward a Policy of Sustainable Forest Management in
Brazil: A Historical Analysis, 144; Fearnside, Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazonia: History, Rates,
and Consequences, 685
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Moran, Deforestation and Land use in the Brazilian Amazon, 10
52
Fearnside, Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazonia: History, Rates, and Consequences, 681
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market price. Set prices for particular crops, irrespective of the location of the farm,
remove the naturally-existing incentive to avoid farming in areas far removed from major
cities and transportation routes.53 In this way, even areas with poor access to roads are
vulnerable.
Due to the success of the Real Plan, Brazil’s inflation rate has been fairly stable
since the late 1990s, greatly reducing the importance of land speculation in driving
deforestation. However, there is still a great amount of money to be earned by
purchasing land in locations where roads are slated to be built, as the connection with
infrastructure greatly increases the land’s value.54 In addition, no changes have been
made to laws protecting the rights of squatters to claim land by clearing it, nor does this
seem likely to occur anytime soon, given that the current regulations are a Constitutional
right. Clashes between environmental and social activists divide what would otherwise be
a powerful coalition as both groups struggle to find a middle ground on issues such as
legal reserve requirements on public land.55
As the global price of soybeans has risen, lobbyists for the industry have gained
considerable sway with the government, particularly in the Amazon, where soybeans
today cover more area than any other crop.56 Currently, strong voices are advocating for
the construction of roads to link Brazil to the western coast of South America, allowing

53

Ibid., 685
Ibid., 685
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Dave Gilbert, "Brazil Vote Sparks Fears for Future of Rainforest," CNN, March 18, 2012.
56
"Municipal Agricultural Production," Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics,
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11, 2012).
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soybeans and other crops to be transported to markets in Asia.57 As seen before, roads
enable access by loggers and farmers to increased areas, and though it has made some
efforts to establish protected areas along new roads, the Brazilian government has a
poor track record of monitoring these areas for illegal settlements.58
One of the major advances made in curbing deforestation is the increased use of
remote sensing from satellite technology to monitor deforestation more easily and
respond more rapidly. For many years, the Brazilian government delayed the release of
deforestation figures for political expediency; for instance, the 1995 peak deforestation
rate was not reported publicly until one month after the 1997 Kyoto Conference on
Global Warming.59 Beginning in 2002, the Brazilian National Institute for Space Research
(Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais, INPE) announced that they will release figures
as soon as they are available. A particularly important program is Detection of
Deforestation in Real Time (Detecção de Desmatamento em Tempo Real, DETER).60 DETER
uses low-resolution photos taken on a daily basis to monitor for deforestation
“hotspots.” Although this provides only rough estimates, it has the advantage of allowing
quick reactions to detected burning or large-scale clearing, an invaluable tool for local
agencies attempting to monitor for deforestation within their jurisdictions.
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Tools such as DETER and its higher-resolution annual counterpart, PRODES, are
all the more valuable because of increased interest on the part of state governments to
make illegal deforestation a priority. Major crackdowns on illegal logging between 2003
and 2006 resulted in the arrests of 186 people, 63 of whom were government employees
who had been taking bribes from loggers to hide their activities.61 Unfortunately, these
gains are relatively small compared to the overall level of unbridled illegal activity.
Although fines totaling US$290 million were issued by the Brazilian Institute of
Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e
dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis, IBAMA) between 2001 and 2004, a scant 2% of this
total was collected.62 Inadequate resources for enforcement plague most environmental
agencies, and in many areas corrupt local officials may tolerate or even encourage
exploitation of forest resources. Other problems include selective logging, which is far
more difficult to detect than complete clearcutting, but which carries a host of negative
impacts that have not been well-studied.63
Despite the many issues driving deforestation, recent years have shown
impressive reductions in the rate of deforestation (Figure 1). Statistics released this year
reported the lowest deforestation rate since the government began monitoring in 1988
(Figure 1).64 This is an impressive accomplishment reflective of the tremendous amount
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of attention given to the problem. However, there is still room for much more progress,
and monitoring cannot be effective unless the government continues funding successful
programs.
One area of conservation policy that has received substantial international
attention is that of markets for environmental services, typically carbon sequestration.
Markets which finance preservation of existing forests and reforestation in cleared lands
are already being implemented on a small-scale throughout Latin America. The UN
program for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) offers a
promising opportunity if the Brazilian government is willing to put in the effort required
to manage a REDD project.65 Other alternatives include the Clean Development
Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol, which can attract funding for projects which can
show that they will reduce CO2 emissions below levels which would have occurred at
baseline.66 Despite the opportunities available, the Brazilian government has not actively
sought to participate in international markets for environmental services at a large scale.
Protected Areas in Brazil
Although many opportunities exist for encouraging biodiversity conservation, this
study will focus primarily on the systems of protected areas within Brazil. This broad
category includes many different legally-defined groups, from fully protected ecological
research stations to indigenous lands to privately-managed reserves. This section
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describes each type of protected area and outlines its relevance to the overall
development of the protected area system.
Conservation units
In 1959, the first protected area in the Brazilian Amazon was established by the
military government in Tocantins.67 However, other than this single park, protected areas
were not a policy focus, and the tool was abandoned for over a decade. In 1974 through
1989, a variety of NGOs, individual activists, and governmental organizations initiated a
landmark process that resulted in the creation of a multitude of national parks, biological
reserves, and ecological stations covering an area the size of New England.68 Inspired by
the success of these early pioneers, a larger coalition was formed in 1989 to assess the
potential for new protected areas in the Amazon and deliver recommendations for their
establishment. After ten years of work, the National System of Conservation Units
(Sistema Nacional de Unidades de Conservação da Natureza, SNUC) was created in 2000
to standardize existing regulation, compile a national database of all preserves, and
promote their maintenance and expansion.69 Although the majority of current CUs are
state- or federal- owned, the SNUC recognizes units formed by municipal governments
as well.
Under SNUC, conservation units (CUs) are divided into one of two categories.
Integral protection CUs are similar to the system of national parks and reserves found in
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the United States; no resources extraction is allowed within their borders, and their sole
purpose is conservation of biodiversity. The second category of CU, sustainable use, is an
innovative creation that attempts to balance the goals of conservation with the
economic realities of poverty and social inequity in Amazonia.70 Sustainable use reserves
were first implemented in the state of Acre as a tool for protecting the traditional land
use rights of local communities whose lands were threatened by the development of
roads, ranches, and farms. Depending on the type of sustainable use CU, logging, smallscale farming, and the persistence of settlements may be allowed within its borders.71
Sustainable use CUs are an important contribution because they enjoy great public
support. Unlike integral protection areas, which are viewed as conflicting with the needs
of poor rural communities by restricting land use, sustainable use preserves are often
embraced and fiercely protected by the people who depend on them for their
livelihoods.72
Indigenous lands
Brazil’s indigenous population has a rich but conflict-ridden history. Currently,
197 distinct indigenous groups live in Brazilian forests, comprising approximately 0.4% of
the population.73 For the majority of the last few centuries, indigenous peoples have
been granted few rights and were often the victims of either intentional or collateral
harm from colonial settlers. Estimates suggest that today’s indigenous population is only
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7% of what it once was in 1500. Coordinated massacres by colonists, ranchers, and the
military completely exterminated another 87 groups in the 20th century alone. 74
Only recently have any efforts been made to protect the traditional rights of
indigenous groups in Brazil. In 1967, the National Indian Fund (Fundação Nacional do
Índio, FUNAI) was created and charged with protecting the interests of indigenous
groups and registering their ownership of land they traditionally occupied. Early progress
was slow and rife with discrimination; only 15% of total indigenous lands were legally
ratified from 1973 to 1981.75 Public pressure in response to continued murders and landgrabbing eventually forced the government to act, and the total amount of legallydefined indigenous land in 2005 was 16.4% of the Legal Amazon, an area larger than all
CUs combined.76 Because of the size of land under indigenous ownership, integration of
indigenous lands is vital to any large-scale program of biodiversity conservation.
Indigenous reserves are an interesting portion of the system of protected areas
because they have very few restrictions on their management. Decisions regarding land
use are left primarily to the indigenous leadership, with little to no oversight by
governmental agencies.77 Because of the lack of regulations, there is significant debate
about the role of indigenous people in conservation. The classical portrait of the noble
guardian of the forest has persisted for many years, fueled by the international
prominence of indigenous activists such as Chico Mendes, the leader of the rubber
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tappers movement, which advocated sustainable use of forest resources by indigenous
groups and other smallholders.78 Today, indigenous groups in many parts of the Amazon
work in conjunction with conservationist groups to monitor for land incursions, and
groups such as the Kayapó have implemented a sustainable game management system
within their lands.79 However, other indigenous tribes have been criticized for entering
into contracts with major commercial interests to allow massive deforestation or mining
on their lands.80 Although the debate over whether indigenous groups actually manage
their lands sustainably continues, the real conclusion is that indigenous people are
neither perfect protectors nor insensitive villains. Rather, like any other group of human
beings, they are strongly influenced by economic and social incentives, and policies
involving indigenous rights should be considered with this in mind.
Private reserves of natural heritage (RPPNs)
The final category of protected areas is the system of Private Reserves of Natural
Heritage (Reservas Particulares do Patrimônio Natural, RPPNs). This system, created by
IBAMA in 1990, allows private landowners to register their land for permanent protection
status. In return, reserves are excluded from some property taxes, and may be prioritized
for certain types of sustainability funding.81 Although RPPNs represent a small fraction of
the total protected area in Brazil, they are a key feature in conservation strategies that
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seek to form biological corridors or between larger, fragmented protected areas.
Especially in the Atlantic Forest, where only 9.3% of the total remaining forest is within
protected areas, RPPNs provide an important opportunity for future conservation.82
Because the designation of an RPPN is completely voluntary, most owners tend to be
seriously committed to forest protection; in many cases, RPPNs are better managed than
state and federal reserves, and many actively encourage ecotourism and environmental
education as a source of revenue.83
Effectiveness and extent of protected areas
Since 2000, international efforts to increase the protected area within the Amazon
have intensified. In 2002, the Brazilian government entered into a commitment with the
World Bank, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), and the Global Environmental Facility to
triple the amount of protected areas in the Amazon under the Amazon Region Protected
Areas program (ARPA).84 Currently, 32% of the total forested Amazon is inside protected
areas, with the majority in indigenous reservations and state and federal reserves (Figure
3).85 In order to avoid land conflicts, most protected areas are established far from the
areas where most deforestation occurs.86 While this places them under less risk of illegal
incursion
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Unfortunately, limited governmental resources often mean that there is little
monitoring for deforestation or invasion within protected areas. Analysis by the WWF in
1999 found that only 8.4% of CUs were well-managed, and 54.6% were in precarious
situation, primarily due to lack of funding.87 Pedlowski et al. monitored deforestation in
CUs in Rondônia from 1992 through 1999; in these seven years, the total amount of
deforested areas increased by 0.7%, a much smaller rate than that outside of protected
areas, but a significant amount nonetheless.88 The problem of deforestation and CUs is
particularly significant in areas that are being considered to be protected in the future –
if squatters and loggers are aware of the possibility that land may soon be restricted,
they will often act quickly to clear as much as possible before doing so becomes illegal.89
In this way, 59.7% of the CUs originally planned in Rondônia were never created, as by
the time the bureaucratic procedures were completed, ranchers and colonists had
degraded these lands beyond the point where they could be considered for any level of
protection.90
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Figure 3. Conservation units and indigenous lands within the Amazon

Data Sources: CUs: MMA, Indigenous lands: FUNAI
In some cases, local governments will actively support illegal logging within CUs,
particularly if the areas are established by the federal or state government. In these
cases, local governments view the protected areas within their borders as an unchosen
impediment to their economic growth, and have few incentives to maintain them.91 The
lack of support for CUs at the local level is a major challenge. When combined with poor
funding for monitoring and enforcement, even the large areas currently protected face a
high risk of deforestation.

91

Loureiro, Contribution of the Ecological ICMS to Biodiversity Conservation in the State of Paraná,

2

32

Despite these limitations, empirical research has shown that the importance of
protected areas as a tool for conservation cannot be overstated. A study by Nepstad et
al. found that sustainable use CUs, integral protection CUs, and indigenous lands all
served to limit deforestation and fires, with much higher rates of both being found just
outside or near the edges of protected areas than inside.92 Simulations of deforestation
by Soares-Filho et al. under business-as-usual projections suggest that by 2050, 2.1
million km2 of the Amazon will be deforested, a reduction to only 53% of the forest’s
original extent. However, if current goals for increased protected areas are met, then this
could reduce total deforestation by 7%, and if the quality of monitoring and
enforcement improves in these protected areas as well, then up to 43% of total
deforestation could be avoided.93
Clearly, CUs and other protected areas have the possibility to becoming a solid
foundation for future environmental protection in Brazil. To increase the usefulness of
protected areas, increased monitoring and action against incursions is required. 94 In
addition, better community engagement and local support are vital, as local groups are
often the most successful at maintaining areas if they have the incentive to do so.
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The Ecological ICMS
History and Structure of the ICMS
The Tax on Circulation of Goods and Services (Imposto sobre a Circulação de
Mercadorias e Prestação de Serviços de Transporte Interestadual e Intermunicipal e de
Comunicação, ICMS) is the main revenue source for state and local governments in
Brazil.95 Established by the 1988 Constitution, the ICMS is a value-added tax, meaning
that it is applied incrementally to goods at each stage of their production. Any transfer of
goods and services, communication, interstate or intrastate transportation, or
importation of goods from abroad is subject to the ICMS, with a few exceptions.
Petroleum is not taxed, and books and newspapers are excluded as well.96 The exact
process by which ICMS receipts are calculated and collected is somewhat complicated,
but its details are not particularly relevant this study, so I will not discuss them here.
All ICMS funds are collected by the state governments. The Federal Constitution
requires that 25% of this total collected is then redistributed to the municipalities within
the state. When determining the criteria by which funding is divided amongst
municipalities, the Constitution requires that 75% of the funding (18.75% of the total
amount at the state level) be passed to municipalities in proportion to where it was
collected. Therefore, municipalities which have higher levels of economic activity (higher
ICMS returns) will receive a greater share. The remaining 25% of the funds passed to
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municipalities (6.25% of the state total) can be distributed according to any criteria
chosen by the state government.97
It is these final 25% of funds passed to municipalities which provide the state with
an opportunity to incentivize policies it wishes to promote. Typical criteria used include
area (larger municipalities receive more), population (more populous municipalities
receive more), or equality (every municipality receive the same amount). But more
innovative policies seek to promote certain behaviors among municipalities. Some states
compensate for the amount of agricultural area, for the presence of cultural heritage
programs, or for the presence of health services or increased health indicators, such as
infant mortality rates.98
The subject of this study is a particular type of “policy-promoting” criterion, the
“ecological ICMS,” or ICMS-e. ICMS-e policies vary significantly between sates, but all
share the common cause of promoting environmental well-being. Some states fund
municipalities for providing sewage treatment services, for maintaining a local
environmental council, or for implementing policies to conserve soil nutrients or to fight
fires.99 But by far the most common ICMS-e policy compensates municipalities for the
amount of protected land within their borders, and it is this type of ICMS-e policy which
we will examine in further depth.

97

Irene Ring, Integrating Local Ecological Services into Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers: The Case
of the ICMS-E in Brazil (Leipzig, Germany: UFZ Department of Economics, 2004), 6-7.
98
Loureiro, Contribution of the Ecological ICMS to Biodiversity Conservation in the State of Paraná,
49-52
99
Ibid., 52

35

History and structure of the ICMS-e
The ICMS-e was first implemented in the state of Paraná in 1991 with two main
goals. The first sought to function as compensation for the lost opportunities for
alternative land development by municipalities with significant amounts of protected
area within their borders. In some cases, the restrictions placed on municipalities are
indeed quite high; for instance, the municipality of Jamarí in Rondônia had a full 55.31%
of its total area protected when the ICMS-e was implemented there in 1996.100 For
municipalities such as this, the ICMS-e represents an opportunity for the state
government to compensate municipalities for a positive externality which they
provide.101 While protected areas serve to maintain biodiversity, capture carbon, and
protect watersheds, many of these benefits do not accrue solely to the municipality in
which they are located – clearly, many of the above benefits serve not just regional, but
also global goals. At the same time, the municipality must bear the full costs of the
protected area, as their future opportunities for development are limited, and they may
be expected to police and maintain the protected area as well. The ICMS-e seeks to
address this externality, thereby increasing local acceptance of and support for protected
areas.
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The second main goal of ICMS-e policies is to not just compensate for existing
opportunity costs, but to also incentivize the creation of new protected areas.102 Simply
by allocating a portion of ICMS funds to municipalities with protected areas, the ICMS-e
increases the incentive to establish more of them. But, as discussed above, simply having
protected areas is not enough to guarantee effective conservation; maintenance and
good governance is also vital. To this end, some states have adopted criteria that not
only consider the extent of area protected, but also the quality of the protected areas.103
The methods by which quality is assessed vary from state to state, but generally include
such things as the presence of a management plan for the protected area, the hiring of
staff to maintain the protected area and monitor for illegal incursions, and the
construction of roads and other infrastructure needed to maintain the protected area.
Functioning of the ICMS-e, an example
To better understand the process by which the ICMS-e works, I here outline the
method by which the ICMS-e is implemented in the state of Mato Grosso, one of the
states of the Legal Amazon, and therefore a part of this study. Although modifications in
the criteria were implemented gradually and have changed several times since,104 this is
not important to the general characterization of the ICMS-e itself, so I present here only
the current policies.
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Distribution of funds in Mato Grosso is determined by 6 different criteria
including the legally-mandated value added. The percentages allocated to each are
presented in Figure 4. Four percent of ICMS funds are transferred according to the
municipality’s own tax revenue as a proportion of total taxes collected statewide, four
percent of the ICMS funds are distributed in proportion to the population of each
municipality, and one percent in proportion to the area of the municipalities. Eleven
percent of ICMS funds are distributed based on a coefficient calculated for each
municipality which considers several factors of social development and distributes funds
to the most impoverished municipalities.
Figure 4. Criteria for determining distribution of ICMS funds to municipalities in Mato
Grosso
Own tax
revenue, 4%
Population 4%
Area, 1%
Value added
75%

Social
coefficient
11%

Protected
areas, 5%

Data source: Normative Instruction no. 1 of May 5, 2010

In Mato Grosso, 5% of the ICMS funds passed from the state to municipalities are
determined by the presence of conservation units and indigenous lands. To qualify, all

38

protected areas must be registered in the State Register of Protected Areas (Cadastro
Estadual de Unidades de Conservação, CEUC). RPPNs are allowed to be registered so long
as they meet certain criteria showing that they provide environmental education,
encourage sustainable production, encourage ecotourism, or otherwise fulfill a greater
social benefit. In addition, municipalities wishing to get credit for their protected areas
must submit a management plan, have an established fund for financing maintenance of
the protected areas, and participate in efforts to solicit community input regarding the
protected areas.105
To calculate the share of ICMS-e funds received by each municipality, the state
environmental agency calculates the weight for each municipality using the following
equations:106
Equation 1
Equation 2
Equation 3
Equation (1) calculates the index for each protected area, Equation (2) sums the
index of all protected areas within a municipality to find the index of the municipality,
and Equation (3) scales the index of each municipality by the sum of the indexes of all
municipalities within the state. The values of type depend on the classification of the
protected area or indigenous land; generally, protected areas which place greater
restrictions on land use have higher values. Metrics such as this allow the state to
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Table 1. Weights of different categories of protected area or indigenous land used to
calculate distribution of ICMS-e funds in Mato Grosso

Protection

Sustainable Use

Integral

Category of protected area

Type
weight

Minimum and Maximum Quality
Scores
Municipal

State

Federal

Biological reserve

1.0

1.0-3.0

1.0-2.0

1.0-2.0

Ecological station

1.0

1.0-3.0

1.0-2.0

1.0-2.0

Natural monument

0.8

1.0-5.0

1.0-3.0

1.0-1.5

Wildlife refuge

0.8

1.0-2.0

1.0-2.0

1.0-1.5

Parks

0.7

1.0-14.3

1.0-5.0

1.0-3.0

Forest

0.5

1.0

1.0-4.0

1.0-1.5

Indigenous land

0.7

1.0

1.0

1.0-4.0

Extractive reserve

0.5

1.0

1.0-2.5

1.0-1.5

Sustainable development reserve

0.5

1.0

1.0

1.0-2.5

Special protection area

0.5

1.0-2.0

1.0

1.0

Wildlife reserve

0.4

1.0

1.0-2.0

1.0-1.5

Area of ecological interest

0.3

1.0

1.0-2.0

1.0

Park road

0.3

1.0

1.0-2.0

1.0

0.2

1.0

1.0-20.0

1.0-15.5

0.2

1.0

1.0-3.0

1.0-2.0

0.5

1.0

1.0

1.0-2.0

Private reserve of natural heritage
(RPPN)
Environmental protection area
(APA)
Quilombolas territories

Data Source: Normative Instruction no. 1 of May 5, 2010

encourage the establishment of certain types of protected areas more than others. A
particularly innovative part of Mato Grosso’s ICMS-e policy is the evaluation of the
quality of the protected area when calculating its index. Unlike the systems of other
states, which only punish municipalities for decreases in the quality of maintenance,
Mato Grosso allows increases in a protected area’s index if it improves.107 The maximum
amount by which a protected area’s quality can increase its index is determined by both
the type of the protected area and the level at which it is managed (municipal, state or
107
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federal). These increases are not insubstantial; RPPNs registered at the state and federal
level can have their indexes multiplied by 20 and 15, respectively. Table 1 shows the
weights for protected area type and quality of management at each level.
ICMS-e policies in the states of the Legal Amazon
Of the nine states of the Legal Amazon, five have passed ecological ICMS laws as
of 2012.108 Of these five, only four had taken effect in 2009, the last year of the study
period. The fifth, Acre, began gradual implementation of ICMS-e in 2010. The types of
areas which qualify for consideration in the ecological ICMS vary between states, as do
methods of monitoring and enforcement in protected areas. Because these differences
provide a unique incentive structure for each state, it is worth understanding what each
state’s laws entail.
Acre
Acre’s ecological ICMS law was passed in 2004, but regulations for its
implementation did not follow until 2009, so the effects of Acre’s ecological ICMS cannot
be assessed in this study.109 When fully implemented in 2014, Acre will have the highest
percentage of its ICMS determined by ecological criteria, at a full 20% of the total funds
passed to municipalities out of the 25% possible.110 Areas which are eligible for
compensation under Acre’s ICMS-e law include indigenous lands; federal, state, and
municipal CUs; and RPPNs. The regulating decree for Acre’s ecological ICMS law also

108

Ecological ICMS
Ibid.; Law no. 322 of December 23, 1996 State of Amapá, Brazil.
110
Decree no. 4918 of December 29, 2009: State of Acre, Brazil.
109

41

allows for consideration of other factors when determining distribution between
municipalities, including legal reserves on farms, health factors such as infant mortality
rates, and quality of schools.111 However, these factors are not currently included in the
formula used by the environmental ministry for determining the distribution of funds.112
Acre does not have any stipulations regarding quality of management within protected
areas, though municipalities must have an environmental ministry to be eligible to
participate, and all ecological ICMS funds are earmarked for sustainable development
projects or maintenance of protected areas.113
Amapá
The state of Amapá passed ecological ICMS regulations in 1996 and
implemented the program in 1997.114 The ICMS-e was implemented gradually, beginning
at 1.1375% of the funds passed to municipalities in 1998, and increasing to 1.4% in 2000.
Amapá’s program includes federal, state, and municipal CUs, as well as RPPNs and
indigenous lands.115 Despite being an earlier program, Amapá’s ecological ICMS includes
some innovative features. Much like Mato Grosso’s policy, different categories of CU are
assigned different weights. For instance, CUs in the “integral protection” category, such
as ecological stations or biological preserves, are given full weight, while indigenous
lands are given only half-weight.116 This method attempts to encourage the
establishment of protected areas which fall under the stricter regulations, while still
111
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allowing some credit for areas which enjoy partial protection only. In addition, when
calculating the index of conservation for each municipality, Amapá’s ICMS-e uses the
quality of management of the protected area in its calculations. Factors considered
include the existence of a management plan, infrastructure, the general environmental
quality in the protected area, and the presence of financial institutions to support and
maintain the protected area.
Mato Grosso
Mato Grosso’s ICMS-e law was passed in 2000 and went into effect in 2002, with
5% of the funds passed to municipalities under the ecological criterion.117 More details
about Mato Grosso’s policies are described above. In the past decade, Mato Grosso has
implemented increasingly complex measures of quality in the computation of its
ecological ICMS. From the beginning of the program, protected areas which could be
shown to have suffered serious environmental degradation would have their
contribution to the municipality’s share reduced by 50%.118 Further legislation
implemented in 2008 added significantly more considerations for the quality of
management, as described previously.119 To support these quality evaluations, Mato
Grosso maintains an extensive system of state departments dedicated to educating the
public about the ecological ICMS, assisting municipalities with the establishment and
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management of protected areas, and monitoring environmental quality within protected
areas.
Rondônia
Rondônia implemented its ecological ICMS in 1996, setting the percentage of
funds determined by this criterion at 5% of the total passed to municipalities.120 Because
Rondônia’s ICMS-e has not been substantially changed since that time, it has the most
simplistic regulations of all the states of the Legal Amazon. There is no weighting based
on type of protected area and no measurement of quality of the protected area included
in the calculations.121 In addition, Rondônia is the only state within the study area which
does not give credit for RPPNs, but only indigenous lands and public protected areas.
The legislation does allow for a disqualification of protected areas from a municipality’s
share if there is evidence of invasion or illegal logging, but as of 2000, this clause had
never been used.122
Tocantins
Tocantins gradually implemented an ecological ICMS from 2003 to 2007.123
Interestingly, Tocantins implemented funding based on several criteria of environmental
management simultaneously, including not just the presence of protected areas and
indigenous lands, but also for the presence of programs to fight fires, maintain basic
sanitation, improve soil conservation, and for the existence of municipal environmental
120
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agencies.124 All together, these programs determined 13% of the total value passed to
municipalities, with the portion for protected areas and indigenous lands at 3.5%. These
additional programs may help to provide the administrative support for environmental
protection both inside and outside protected areas, as well as raise awareness of and
funding for various environmental concerns. Tocantins’ ecological ICMS includes some
fairly basic measurements of quality as well, assessing the presence of infrastructure, a
management plan, and whether or not the municipal environmental council is
undertaking initiatives to enhance environmental quality within the protected areas.125
Evaluating the Effectiveness of the ICMS-e
To date, there have been no statistical or econometric studies of the effectiveness
of the ICMS-e. Loureiro presents an in-depth analysis of the impact of the ICMS-e in
Paraná, but he does not attempt to control for other variables when concluding that the
implementation of the ICMS-e led to an increase in protected areas.126 Other authors
evaluating the ICMS-e make the same claim, ascribing an increase in protected areas
following the implementation of the ICMS-e to its effectiveness.127 But because
designation of protected areas is permanent, it is extremely unsurprising that the
amount of protected area within municipalities increases following the implementation
of the ICMS-e; after all, the only other alternative is for the total protected area to remain
constant. Given the extent of recent programs designed to increase protected areas in
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Brazil, it would, in fact, be surprising if protected area did not increase following the
implementation of ICMS-e policies.128 As a result, there is a real need for an evaluation of
the ICMS-e which separates its effects from other variables driving the establishment of
protected areas, which is what this paper aims to do.
Although they do not offer statistical analysis of its effects, anecdotal reports
from interviews with stakeholders in states where the ICMS-e has been implemented
suggest that it has at the very least influenced perceptions regarding conservation areas.
Several commentators expressed the opinion that the implementation of the ICMS-e
made municipal governments stop to assess the protected areas which already existed
within their boundaries, viewing these areas as assets for the very first time.129 In
interviews with municipal mayors, managers of reserves, and other relevant stakeholders,
Loureiro found that municipal governments which had previously viewed protected areas
as a hindrance to development and maintained antagonistic relationships with CU
managers were now more open to the establishment and growth of protected areas
within their borders.130 Even if the ICMS did not directly lead to a greater number of
protected areas, even just the government signal that conservation is a worthwhile issue
is a great accomplishment. In this way, the ICMS-e serves an important public relations
function. By internalizing the positive externalities generated by protected areas, the
ICMS-e has increased acceptance of protected areas by rewarding those who have them
and signaling to those who don’t that doing so would be beneficial. In addition, the
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ICMS-e has spread awareness of the existence and functioning of protected areas,
hopefully leading to better, more informed decisions in the future.
In many cases, the ICMS-e has not just opened municipal government’s eyes to
CUs, but has raised public awareness of the importance of biodiversity conservation as
well. In some states, such as Mato Grosso, the ICMS-e legislation itself requires
municipalities to engage in education initiatives to obtain any ICMS-e funds, so these
policies would clearly result in increased community awareness.131 In others, however, the
effect is more indirect, and must be initiated at the municipal level, as there is little
leadership from the state government.(Grieg-Gran 2000, 1-32)
Implementation of the ICMS-e by state governments requires extensive
institutional organization. Monitoring the number and quality of protected areas is no
small task, especially if the quality monitoring is comprehensive. As a result, the process
of administering the ICMS-e will likely strengthen the skills and knowledge of
professionals working within state environmental agencies.132 In Paraná, local
governments enter into terms of agreement with CU managers, pledging increased
support and assistance for the protected area in order to maintain their newly-acquired
source of revenue.133 Increases in public-private partnerships form strong foundations for
future conservation efforts, especially if current agreements are held. In this way, the
ICMS-e forms a coalition between municipal leaders and the owners/managers of

131

Normative Instruction no. 1 of May 5, 2010
Grieg-Gran, Fiscal Incentives for Biodiversity Conservation: The ICMS Ecológico in Brazil, 29
133
Loureiro, Contribution of the Ecological ICMS to Biodiversity Conservation in the State of Paraná,
114-116
132

47

protected areas; where before the groups were antagonistic, they can now help each
other in mutually beneficial ways.134
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CHAPTER III. MODEL AND METHODS
Estimation Model
No reviewed literature evaluated the determinants of establishing protected
areas directly. This may be because there is no single actor whose incentives can be
evaluated; instead, protected areas can be public or private, indigenous lands, and can
be established at all three levels of government. As a result, it is not easy to find a single
model that captures the many motivating factors leading to the establishment of
protected areas.
My approach to dealing with this problem is to model the drivers behind
establishing protected areas indirectly by focusing on the demand for land. Because
creation of a protected area constrains alternative land uses, it represents a significant
opportunity cost for the owner and potential future users of the land. I based my model
around the idea that factors which increase demand for land will drive up the
opportunity cost of creating new protected areas, thereby decreasing the likelihood that
they will be established. This approach has the advantage of a greater treatment in the
literature – while few, if any, studies model the establishment of protected areas, a great
many model the demand for land.135
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Factors affecting the demand for land in the Amazon
Historically, land use change in the Amazon has been driven by a multitude of
factors, many of which were discussed in the preceding section. Because ICMS-e funds
are distributed at the municipal level, it makes sense to consider the motivations of
municipalities in either establishing protected areas themselves or supporting others’
efforts to do so. Municipal governments in the Amazon are generally responsive to local
social pressures, especially if they are part of an organized movement or if they represent
important economic interests.136 As a result, government decision-making will likely lean
either towards what seems most socially acceptable and politically feasible, or towards
what seems most profitable to either independent government agents or the region as a
whole.
If there is significant local support for environmental causes, then this alone
might be enough to cause governments to create new protected areas, even if doing so
precludes more lucrative economic uses of the land. However, with a few exceptions,
grassroots movements in Brazil have not placed much emphasis on environmental
issues, while still others advocate policies which are actively detrimental to conservation.
For instance, landless workers groups have advocated intensely for the opening of more
areas for settlement, and would generally oppose any efforts to limit their ability to
expropriate land.137 In the past, indigenous groups such as the Rubber Tappers
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Movement have brought international attention to the Amazon by campaigning for
opportunities for settlement while simultaneously advocating sustainable practices.138 In
this case, social pressures would incentivize the creating of sustainable use areas, as well
as the registration of indigenous reserves.
The clear economic powers with significant land interests in the Brazilian Amazon
are large-scale ranchers and farmers. Both of these groups have strong reasons to
oppose any protected areas, which limit the available amount of land, thereby driving up
land prices. Ranchers in particular typically practice extensive methods which use land
inefficiently, as much of the Amazon is poor pasture for cattle.139 As a result, ranchers
have strong incentives to not only clear the mandated 80% of their property that is a
legal reserve, but to also oppose any efforts to limit future land acquisition in the area.
In recent years, the international market for soybeans has helped make the
soybean farmers in the Amazon extremely wealthy and influential.140 Soy is a landintensive crop, but, more importantly, it is strongly dependent on low transportation
costs.141 Soybean farmers have successfully lobbied the government for more and
improved roads throughout the Amazon to allow them to more easily export their crops
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internationally.142 While the direct effect of increased soy farming on demand for land
may be positive, the indirect effect of road building which typically accompanies soy
farming is likely to be even more significant. As discussed in the previous chapter, roads
are a key feature in increasing deforestation and demand for land, allowing access by
farmers, settlers, ranchers, and loggers.143
In many models of deforestation, increased population or population density is
found to increase demand for land.144 Simply put, more people mean more people who
want land. However, the composition of increased population is important; while
increased rural populations will directly impact the demand for land, urban populations
have minimal land demands.145 Therefore, it is important to control for the rural/urban
makeup when evaluating the impact of population.
A final variable which is important to consider is the impact of increased wealth.
Like population, the distribution of wealth is important – many impoverished people may
appear to be identical to that of a few relatively wealthy persons at a gross level, but the
effects of these two populations would be substantially different. In general, greater
economic prosperity allows for investment in machinery that promotes land-intensive
farming practices, or increase opportunities for employment outside of the agricultural
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sector.146 Both of these changes would negatively impact the demand for land,
suggesting that an increase in economic well-being would be correlated with increased
protected area.
Model description
In all regressions of this study, I used fixed effects evaluation of panel data. Fixed
effects is a useful tool here because it can control for time-invariant features present in
each group of the panel – in this case, the municipalities. Fixed effects estimation takes
the mean of the dependent and each independent variable over time. These means are
then subtracted from the variable at each time period in a process called timedemeaning.147 Equation (4) shows the original estimation model used for the fixed effects
regression.
Equation 4
The important feature of fixed effects is the fact that any variables which are
constant across time will have a value of zero after they are demeaned, as their values
are always identical to the mean. These entity-specific fixed effects are shown in Equation
(4) as ai alone; in reality, there would be as many entity fixed effects as there are
municipalities The benefit of time-demeaning is that it controls for variance in the
dependent variable that is due to differences across the data set. In this case, it is not
hard to imagine that municipalities might have different histories of conservation,
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societal makeups, or NGO and other institutional presences which would lead them to
have differentiated levels of protected area. With fixed effects, these municipality-specific
constants are eliminated, allowing for a more efficient estimation of the effects of the
included explanatory variables.
An alternative specification controls for the fixed effects due to the year by
adding year dummies which change the intercept of the regression. This is done with
using Equation (5). Year-specific effects should only be included if they are jointly
statistically significant.

Equation 5
Study Area and Time Period
The study area used was the government-defined Legal Amazon, an area
consisting of nine Brazilian states.148 Although technically the entire state of Maranhão is
not included within the boundaries of the Legal Amazon, its complete area is included in
this study. The Legal Amazon is primarily a rural region with an agricultural-based
economy and the majority of its area is dominated by tropical moist forests.149 Ecological
issues in the Amazon have been more thoroughly researched than in other ecosystems
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of Brazil due to its importance in regional and global climate and biodiversity.150 The
panel data set includes a total of 807 municipalities within these nine states. Data were
collected for as many years as were possible. The years 1999 through 2009 were chosen
as the target time frame, as this was the extent of economic data such as GDP and Gini
coefficients available, and because demographic data are difficult to obtain for years
prior to 2000.
Data Sources
Most data were obtained from Brazilian government websites, primarily the
Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e
Estatística, IBGE). A key feature of my analysis was the use of Geographic Information
Systems (GIS) data. Using GIS maps allowed me to obtain information that is not
available and to make spatially-explicit connections between existing data. Following is a
discussion of the sources of the data used in the study and the calculations and
assumptions that were made in order to use the data within my model.
Municipality Areas
The borders of many municipalities changed within the study period, often
several times, and occasionally by large amounts. Some of this is due to poor data
quality; because many of the municipalities are located within sparsely-inhabited regions
of the Amazon, precise definitions of the municipal borders were not possible for many
years. In other instances, territorial disputes or changes in the number of municipalities
150
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within the state resulted in redefinition of pre-existing boundaries. To include these
changes in my analysis, I obtained GIS layers of the municipal borders for as many years
as were available. Newly created municipalities are included in the analysis beginning in
the year in which they were created.
IBGE offers vector-format files for the years 2001, 2005, and 2007, while the
Brazilian Ministry of the Environment (MMA) offers files for the years 2001 and 2005.151
The MMA cites the IBGE as the source for its data, but offers a higher spatial resolution
for the 2001 data than is available for download from IBGE. As a result, I used the 2001
layer from the MMA and the 2005 and 2007 layers from IBGE.
Because the panel data requires values for each year, except when otherwise
noted, I used a linear transformation to calculate the changes in municipality area in
years between the available layers. Thus, for instance, the municipality areas for 2006
were calculated to be the sum of the 2005 area and half the difference between the 2005
and 2007 areas. Because data prior to 2001 and after 2007 was unavailable, I assumed
that all states had the same borders in 1999-2000 as in 2001, and that 2007 borders
remained unchanged in 2008-2009.152
During the study period, the state of Mato Grosso created new municipalities
twice, in 2001 and 2005.153 This was done by dividing up the areas of previously-existing
municipalities into multiple new ones, changing not only the borders of the new
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municipalities, but also reducing the area of some that had previously existed. Thirteen
municipalities were created in 2001, which resulted in border changes for fifteen
municipalities that already existed. The 2001 layer of data depicts modified municipalities
in their reduced borders, but does not label or divide the area that would become the
thirteen new municipalities. As a result, area data for the new municipalities was taken
from the 2005 layer, and assumed to have been constant from 2001-2005. For
municipalities which had modified borders in 2001, no area data was included for 19992000, as here was no clear way to determine their previous full extent. Two new
municipalities were created in 2005 from within the borders of two other previouslyexisting municipalities. Because their area changes were known to be due to the creation
of new municipalities, which definitively happened in 2005, the municipalities modified in
2005 were assigned a sudden transition in area from their 2001 extent to their 2005
extent rather than the linear change which was assumed for all other municipalities.
While municipalities within other states showed at times significant border changes
between the three years of data, no new municipalities were created in states other than
Mato Grosso.
Protected Areas
For the purpose of this study, protected areas included all conservation units
(unidades de conservação, CUs) that are registered within the National System of
Conservation Units (SNUC). This includes areas managed at the federal, state, and
municipal level, as well as CUs within both the integral protection and sustainable use
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categories. All GIS data on CUs were obtained from the MMA.154 Because every state
which uses an ecological ICMS also considers the presence of indigenous lands (terras
indígenas) when calculating funding distributions, these were considered “protected
areas” as well. Data on indigenous territories were obtained from the National
Foundation for Indians (FUNAI).155
ESRI ArcMap was used to calculate the total protected area within each
municipality for each year. A protected area was first included in a municipality’s total in
the year in which it was registered in the SNUC (in the case of CUs), or in the year in
which it was first registered with FUNAI (in the case of indigenous land). Though these
areas may have been formed prior to their registration at the national level, my
assumption was nonetheless acceptable because most ICMS-e programs do not
recognize protected areas that are not registered at either the national or state level.
For all municipalities, any protected area created within their borders prior to the
study period (1998 or earlier) was counted in their total for the beginning of the study
period. Municipalities which had modified borders in 2001 had no data for the period of
1999-2000, as it is unknown what their original extent was, so they may have had
significantly more protected area than suggested by available data. Any protected areas
created prior to 2001 within the post-2001 borders of these counties were counted
beginning in 2001. Because the 2001 layer did not contain boundary information for
newly-created municipalities, I assumed that these counties maintained the same
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borders in 2001-2004 as they were depicted in the 2005 layer. Other than the exceptions
noted above, a protected area was counted as within the borders of a municipality if it
was within its 2001 borders for the period of 1999-2004, if it was within its 2005 borders
for the period of 2005-2006, and if it was within its 2007 borders for the period of 20072009.
Population and Demographics
Population data for the entire study period came from IBGE. For the year 2000,
population figures are from the census, and for the year 2007, population figures are
from the national population count.156 For all other years(Anonymous2011d), population
figures are estimates by IBGE.157
Detailed demographic data at the municipal level was only available in census
years (2000 and 2010). I calculated the rural population percentage for each municipality
by taking the rural population in 2000 and 2010 as a percentage of the total population.
I then used a linear transformation for the intervening years, assuming that the
percentage (not numerical values) of the rural population changed steadily during the
period from 2001-2009. I used the same procedure to find the indigenous percentage of
the population in each year.
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To find demographic information for the year 1999, I turned to the 1996
population count, which, unlike its 2007 counterpart, presented some demographic data
at the municipal level.158 No racial data was available, so no municipality has information
on the indigenous composition of its population for the year 1999. The 1996 population
count did, however, provide information on the number of rural and urban households
within a municipality. Using this, I calculated a linear transition in the rural percentage of
the population from 1996 to 2000, which enabled me to have a value for the 1999 rural
population.
Municipalities created in 2001 and 2005 were not included in the 2000 census. As
a result, I could not perform the linear calculations of either indigenous or rural
populations, so for all newly-created municipalities, this demographic data is missing for
all years. In addition, the states of Rondônia, Roraima, Pará, Amapá, Tocantins,
Maranhão, and Mato Grosso all created new municipalities in the period from 19961999. These 140 municipalities have no data for rural population in the year 1999, as they
are not present in the 1996 population count.
Economic Variables
The IBGE provides annual estimates of the gross domestic product (GDP) of
municipalities for 1999-2009.159 These are reported in thousand current (2012) Brazilian
reais. Per capita GDP was calculated by dividing the municipal-level data by the
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population for that year. Gini coefficients are provided by IBGE at the state level.160
Therefore, they measure the division of state-level GDP amongst the entire state
population. The gross annual value added was also collected at the state level from
IBGE.161
Agriculture
I collected two types of agricultural data, both provided by IBGE. The first
measures the planted area of land (in hectares) of permanent and temporary agricultural
production, and comes from the annual survey of municipal agricultural production.162
Permanent agriculture includes such things as coffee, cocoa, oranges, bananas, rubber,
and agave. Temporary agriculture (sometimes called annual or shifting agriculture) is
predominated by soybeans, with other major crops including rice, sugar cane, corn,
beans, and wheat. In general, area of temporary agriculture is much larger than the area
of permanent agriculture in the Amazon.
The second measure of agricultural data looked at livestock, particularly cattle.
Ideally, a measure of the amount of pasture would be used, but as this was not available
at the municipal level, I instead used information on the number of cattle and other
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livestock, including sheep, pigs, and goats. All livestock information was taken from the
IBGE’s annual municipal livestock survey.163
Climate and Topography
Because some previous studies linked climactic data with land use, I also included
one climactic variable: annual rainfall. This data was collected in GIS form from the
collection of Environmental Variables for Modeling the Distribution of Species
(AMBDATA), maintained by the Image Processing Division (DPI) of the National Institute
of Space Research (INPE).164 A raster grid of the average total annual rainfall from 19502000, in mm, was used to calculate the mean annual rainfall in each municipality. Each of
the three municipality border layers (2001, 2005, and 2007) was used so that despite
changes in municipality borders, whether due to the creation of new municipalities or
because of minor modification to the borders due to territorial disputes, annual rainfall
statistics reflect the updated municipality area. The assumptions used in these
calculations are the same as those used for calculating protected area within each
municipality.
Log Transformations
Much of the data was transformed using the natural log of the values in order to
obtain easily interpretable coefficients. Any missing data (for reasons discussed above)
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remained missing after the log transformation. Data values of zero or less than one
would return uninterpretable negative values after log transformation, so their log values
were set to zero.
Data Analysis
All statistical analysis was performed using STATA. I used a fixed-effects model
with robust standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity and correlation between
variables.
The dependent variable for all regressions was the natural log of the area of land
protected within each municipality expressed in square kilometers. Two forms of the
main independent variable were used. The first, a continuous value, was the percentage
of each state’s ICMS that was determined based on the area protected within each
municipality. The second was a set of two dummy variables set to 1 for the presence and
0 for the absence of one of two different categories of ICMS-e policy. ICMS-e area only
captures ICMS-e policies which do not monitor for the quality of protected area when
determining distribution of ICMS-e funds, while ICMS-e quality describes those that do.
These dummies were chosen because they represent the two main “categories” of ICMSe policies. In states which do not monitor for quality of protected areas, municipalities
can receive funding for establishing mere “paper parks,” which have no real monitoring
or management, and are often subject to invasion and deforestation.165 On the other
hand, ICMS-e policies which monitor for quality incentivize maintenance, but increase
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the cost of establishing a park with the implicit assumption that funding for maintenance
will be required indefinitely. This suggests that ICMS-e policies which do not monitor for
quality are likely to have a larger impact on the total area protected, but may be poorly
maintained in comparison.
Various models were tested with many different combinations of explanatory
variables. I first regressed the ICMS-e percentage and dummies alone on the logtransformed protected area in order to assess whether the policy had an effect before
controlling for other variables. Adding dummy variables for each year to control for both
municipality and year fixed effects showed strong joint significance (P-value = 0.0000), so
I included these dummies in many of the following regressions.
Next, I tested for significance of each explanatory variable by regressing the
ICMS-e percentage and dummies with each other explanatory variable alone on the
protected area. All variables that were significant in the above tests were combined into
a single regression to test whether they remained significant together.
Using information from the literature review, I tested the combination of variables
I believed would have the strongest effect on the amount of protected area. Because I
used fixed effects, any variables which changed very little over the study period would
not contribute to explaining the variation, as they are mostly captured in the eliminated
fixed effects.166 For this reason, I did not include the area of the municipality or the
annual rainfall in this expanded model. Literature suggests that cattle ranching, soybean
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production, and smallholder farming are the main agricultural drivers of deforestation in
the Brazilian Amazon, so I included these along with demographic variables.
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CHAPTER IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Summary Statistics
Table 2. Summary statistics of level dependent and independent variables
Variable

Mean

Median

15,146

794

change in area protected (km )

145

ICMS-e percentage

Standard

Minimum

Maximum

34,331

0

318,291

0

1,829

0

90,705

1.26

0

2.01

0

5

28,321

12,919

88,703

711

1,738,641

per capita GDP (current R$)

5,715

3,570

7,999

640

131,070

Gini coefficient

0.719

0.708

0.062

0.607

0.895

15,167

10,916

13,670

1,478

52,777

6,368

2,097

13,551
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160,773

810

120

2,190

0

30,487

13,108

3,150

46,682

0

847,869

head of cattle

79,315

32,976

121,581

0

1,912,009

number of other livestock

11,174

6,721

14,841

0

269,195

45.93

47.44

20.12

0.24

98.44

2.20

0.17

7.44

0

86.77

1,881

1,817

405

1,051

3,362

area protected (km2)
2

population

value added (current million R$)
2

area (km )
area of permanent agriculture
(ha)
area of temporary agriculture
(ha)

population living in rural
households (percent)
indigenous population (percent)
average annual rainfall (mm)

deviation

Note: Value added was summarized at the state, not municipality level

From the summary statistics (Table 2), it is clear that there is a wide variation in
the area protected per municipality. Over half of municipalities had protected areas
during the study period, though the data is significantly right-skewed. Population and
GDP in the Legal Amazon are generally low, though there are some notable exceptions
to this norm. Gini coefficients were relatively high. The median municipality had
approximately half of its population living in rural households, though municipalities with
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larger populations tend to be more urban. Areas of temporary agriculture outnumber
areas of permanent agriculture to a great extent, and the number of cattle predominate
the number of all other livestock combined.(Smith and others 1998, 31-46)
Regressions
Throughout this analysis, I used two different representations of the ICMS-e
policy: the percentage of ICMS funds that are distributed along ecological criteria (ICMSe percentage) and two dummy variables indicating the presence an ICMS-e policy based
on total protected area alone (ICMS-e area only) and the presence of an ICMS-e policy
which also monitors for quality in protected areas (ICMS-e quality).
I first performed a simple fixed effects regression with each ICMS-e specification
(Table 3, regressions 1 and 2). Dummy variables for each year of analysis were jointly
significant (P-value = 0.0000), so I also regressed each ICMS-e specification with year
dummies (Table 3, regressions 3 and 4).
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Table 3. ICMS-e regressed on log-transformed area protected with municipality and both year and municipality fixed effects
Dependent variable: ln(Area protected)
Explanatory Variable
ICMS-e percentage

ICMS-e alone
(1)
0.052***

With year dummies
(2)

(3)

[0.011]

–0.035***

(4)
[0.015]

ICMS-e area only dummy

0.184***

[0.043]

–0.063***

[0.058]

ICMS-e quality dummy

0.282***

[0.059]

–0.102***

[0.081]

year 2000 dummy

0.033***

[0.014]

0.033***

[0.014]

year 2001 dummy

0.084***

[0.024]

0.086***

[0.024]

year 2002 dummy

0.249***

[0.042]

0.233***

[0.041]

year 2003 dummy

0.267***

[0.044]

0.255***

[0.046]

year 2004 dummy

0.316***

[0.052]

0.309***

[0.054]

year 2005 dummy

0.393***

[0.060]

0.382***

[0.061]

year 2006 dummy

0.446***

[0.064]

0.432***

[0.064]

year 2007 dummy

0.476***

[0.067]

0.456***

[0.065]

year 2008 dummy

0.499***

[0.068]

0.486***

[0.069]

year 2009 dummy

0.540***

[0.070]

0.526***

[0.071]

Number of observations

8809 (807 groups)

Rho

0.9739

8809 (807 groups)
0.9740

8809 (807 groups)
0.9750

8809 (807 groups)
0.9750

Within R2

0.0057

0.0086

0.0525

0.0514

Notes: All standard errors shown are robust. The year 1999 is omitted from regressions (3) and (4). Two ** indicate significance at the 5% level, ***
indicates significance at the 1% level.

With only municipality fixed effects, the ICMS-e policy had a significant positive
correlation with protected area. For every 1 point increase in the percentage of ICMS
funds passed from states to municipalities, there was a corresponding 5.35% increase in
the amount of protected area in a municipality.167 The dummy variables representing the
ICMS-e policy can be used to compare the effectiveness of different types of ICMS-e
policy. From regression (2), we can see that policies which reward municipalities for
having protected area resulted in a 20.15% increase in protected area over states which
had no ICMS-e policies. Contrary to expectations, policies which monitored for quality in
protected areas when determining distribution of ICMS-e funds were even more
effective, with a 32.57% increase in protected areas over those without any ICMS-e
policy.
However, once dummy variables are included, the effect of ICMS-e policies on
protected area is much less clear. Only the ICMS-e percentage is significant, but its
coefficient is negative, suggesting that states which increase the percentage of funds
passed to municipalities for ecological criteria by 1 percentage point will experience a
3.52% decrease in the amount of protected area within municipalities, all else equal. All
year dummies were significant and positive, showing a clear upward trend in the total
area protected from 1999-2009.
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The log-transformed dependent variable is useful because it approximates the percentage
change in the dependent variable for a given increase in the independent variable. However, this
approximation becomes less accurate when coefficients are relatively high. All numbers presented
in discussion use the formula
to calculate the exact percentage change in the
dependent variable for a 1-unit increase in the independent variable.
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Table 3. ICMS-e regressed on log-transformed area protected with municipality and both year and municipality fixed effects
Dependent variable: ln(Area protected)
Explanatory Variable
ICMS-e percentage

ICMS-e alone
(1)
0.052***

With year dummies
(2)

(3)

[0.011]

–0.035***

(4)
[0.015]

ICMS-e area only dummy

0.184***

[0.043]

–0.063***

[0.058]

ICMS-e quality dummy

0.282***

[0.059]

–0.102***

[0.081]

year 2000 dummy

0.033***

[0.014]

0.033***

[0.014]

year 2001 dummy

0.084***

[0.024]

0.086***

[0.024]

year 2002 dummy

0.249***

[0.042]

0.233***

[0.041]

year 2003 dummy

0.267***

[0.044]

0.255***

[0.046]

year 2004 dummy

0.316***

[0.052]

0.309***

[0.054]

year 2005 dummy

0.393***

[0.060]

0.382***

[0.061]

year 2006 dummy

0.446***

[0.064]

0.432***

[0.064]

year 2007 dummy

0.476***

[0.067]

0.456***

[0.065]

year 2008 dummy

0.499***

[0.068]

0.486***

[0.069]

year 2009 dummy

0.540***

[0.070]

0.526***

[0.071]

Number of observations

8809 (807 groups)

Rho

0.9739

8809 (807 groups)
0.9740

8809 (807 groups)
0.9750

8809 (807 groups)
0.9750

Within R2

0.0057

0.0086

0.0525

0.0514

Notes: All standard errors shown are robust. The year 1999 is omitted from regressions (3) and (4). Two ** indicate significance at the 5% level, ***
indicates significance at the 1% level.

Before combining multiple other explanatory variables, I tested for the individual
significance of each variable with either ICMS-e specification. Table 4 reports all variables
which were statistically significant with either the ICMS-e percentage (regressions 1 and
2) or the ICMS-e dummies (regressions 3 and 4), while controlling for both municipality
and year fixed effects. Table 5 reports the same information while controlling only for
municipality fixed effects. In all regressions not shown in Tables 4 and 5, the explanatory
variables other than the ICMS-e were not significant.
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Table 4. ICMS-e regressed and other significant explanatory variables regressed on log-transformed area protected with both year and
municipality fixed effects
Dependent variable: ln(Area protected)
rural population percent only
Explanatory variable
(1)
(2)
ICMS-e percentage
–0.036*** [0.015]
ICMS-e area only dummy
–0.072*** [0.058]
ICMS-e quality dummy
–0.981*** [0.081]
rural population percent –0.019*** [0.009] –0.019*** [0.009]
ln(rain)
year 2000 dummy
0.042*** [0.021]
0.040*** [0.021]
year 2001 dummy
0.087*** [0.031]
0.086*** [0.031]
year 2002 dummy
0.239*** [0.049]
0.220*** [0.048]
year 2003 dummy
0.247*** [0.052]
0.235*** [0.054]
year 2004 dummy
0.288*** [0.061]
0.277*** [0.063]
year 2005 dummy
0.356*** [0.066]
0.342*** [0.067]
year 2006 dummy
0.400*** [0.069]
0.382*** [0.070]
year 2007 dummy
0.421*** [0.074]
0.396*** [0.073]
year 2008 dummy
0.435*** [0.076]
0.414*** [0.077]
year 2009 dummy
0.466*** [0.079]
0.445*** [0.080]
Number of observations
8541 (792 groups) 8541 (792 groups)
Rho
0.9754
0.9754
Within R2
0.0580
0.0568

ln(rain) only
(3)
–0.035*** [0.015]

(4)
–0.064***
–0.105***

7.281*** [4.205]
0.033*** [0.014]
0.084*** [0.024]
0.250*** [0.042]
0.268*** [0.044]
0.318*** [0.052]
0.395*** [0.060]
0.448*** [0.064]
0.477*** [0.067]
0.500*** [0.068]
0.541*** [0.067]
8809 (807 groups)
0.9730
0.0536

[0.058]
[0.081]

7.292*** [4.209]
0.033*** [0.014]
0.087*** [0.024]
0.233*** [0.041]
0.256*** [0.046]
0.310*** [0.054]
0.385*** [0.061]
0.434*** [0.065]
0.458*** [0.065]
0.488*** [0.069]
0.529*** [0.071]
8809 (807 groups)
0.9730
0.0525

Notes: All standard errors shown are robust. The year 1999 is omitted from all regression. One * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates
significance at the 5% level, *** indicates significance at the 1% level. All explanatory variables not shown in this table were not significant when
regressed alone with either ICMS-e specification.
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When both municipality and year fixed effects were included, the ICMS-e
percentage was significant and negative in all cases, while the ICMS-e dummy variables
were only significant in one case (with the indigenous population percentage). The
coefficients on the ICMS-e variables do not change much when a single other
explanatory variable is added – compare the values in regressions (3) and (4) of Table 3
to those in Table 4. What is interesting here is the effect of significant other explanatory
variables. In both regressions (1) and (2), the percentage of the population residing in
rural households has a negative effect on the amount of area protected, with a 1
percentage point increase in the rural population correlated with about a 1.94% decrease
in the amount of protected area within a municipality. This relationship highlights the
importance of rural population as a driver of demand for land. While urban populations
may increase land demand indirectly through increased demand for agricultural products
and other natural resources, it is rural farmers and ranchers who directly impact demand
for land.168 Accordingly, increased demand for land means that, all else equal, land prices
are higher, increasing the opportunity cost of establishing protected areas. This is
especially true in places where land resources are more limited, which is the case in
states with higher population densities.
Interestingly, an increase in a municipality’s average annual rainfall was correlated
with huge increases in protected area; a 1% increase in total rainfall was correlated with
an astonishing 145,177.24% increase in the amount of protected area! To scale this
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Lykke E. Andersen and Eustáquio J. Reis, Deforestation, Development, and Government Policy in
the Brazilian Amazon: An Econometric Analysis (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Brazilian Applied Economic
Research Institute, 1997), 2.
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reference, we can use the “mean municipality,” which had an average annual rainfall of
1,881 mm and 15,146 km2 of protected area (Table 2).169 A 1% increase in annual rain to
1,889 mm would increase the protected area to 2.199 trillion km2, an area larger than not
just the Amazon, but almost 300 times the size of the entire country of Brazil. Clearly, this
is not a realistic interpretation. An important note is that ln(rain) was only significant at
the 10% level in both regressions (3) and (4), so it has a very wide confidence interval.
Taking the lower 95% bound, rain actually has a negative effect on protected area. This
strongly suggests that, due to random chance and possible spatial correlation, the
coefficient on ln(rain) was vastly overestimated (Figure 5)
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These figures do not represent any actually existing municipality, but are rather the means
across the whole sample. They can nonetheless serve as a point of reference for estimations such
as the one given here.
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Figure 5. Average annual rainfall in the Amazon, 1950-2000

Data Source: “Environmental Variables for Modeling the Distribution of Species (AMBDATA),” INPE

However, fine-scale modeling in the Amazon by Chomitz and Thomas found that
even when controlling for proximity to roads, cities, and older cleared areas, increased
rainfall led to significant declines in the proportion of land cleared for agriculture.170
These results suggest that although my data may be upwardly biased by omitted
variables, rain truly does reduce the demand for land, thereby encouraging the
establishment of protected areas.
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1024.
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Table 5. ICMS-e percentage and other significant explanatory variables regressed on log-transformed area protected with municipality fixed effects
Dependent variable: ln(Area protected)
Explanatory
variable
ICMS-e
percentage
ln(population)
ln(GDP per
capita)
ln(value
added)
Gini
coefficient
ln(cattle)
rural
population
percent
indigenous
population
percent
Number of
observations
Rho
Within R2

ln(population)
only

ln(GDP per capita)
only

ln(value added)
only

Gini coefficient
only

ln(cattle) only

Rural population
percent only

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.037*** [0.011] –0.027*** [0.014] –0.042***

[0.015] 0.055*** [0.011] 0.039*** [0.011]

0.023***

[0.012]

–0.043***

[0.009]

Indigenous
population
percent only
(7)
0.040***

[0.010]

0.043***

[0.025]

0.719*** [0.140]
0.373*** [0.055]
0.408***

[0.056]
3.194*** [1.753]
0.226*** [0.061]

8809 (807
groups)
0.9727
0.0196

8809 (807 groups)

8809 (807 groups)

0.9748
0.0402

0.9750
0.0496

8809 (807
groups)
0.9735
0.0071

8809 (807
groups)
0.9747
0.0176

8541 (792 groups)
0.9760
0.0341

7905 (792
groups)
0.9757
0.0060

Notes: All standard errors shown are robust. One * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and *** indicates significance at the
1% level. All variables not included in this table were not statistically significant alone with the ICMS-e percentage.

Table 6. ICMS-e dummies and other significant explanatory variables regressed on log-transformed area protected with municipality
fixed effects
Dependent variable: ln(Area protected)
Explanatory
variable
ICMS-e area
only dummy
ICMS-e quality
dummy
ln(population)
ln(GDP per
capita)
ln(value added)
ln(cattle)
rural
population
percent
indigenous
population
percent
Number of
observations
Rho
Within R2

ln(population)
only

ln(GDP per capita)
only

ln(value added)
only

ln(cattle) only

Rural population
percent only

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Indigenous
population
percent only
(6)

0.154***

[0.043]

–0.045***

[0.054]

–0.085***

[0.057]

0.132***

[0.045]

0.110***

[0.043]

0.128***

[0.038]

0.209***

[0.060]

–0.068***

[0.073]

–0.146***

[0.082]

0.226***

[0.060]

0.151***

[0.062]

0.223***

[0.052]

0.697***

[0.142]
0.359***

[0.055]
0.399***

[0.058]
0.219***

[0.061]
–0.041***

[0.009]

0.043***

[0.025]

8809 (807
groups)
0.9729
0.0216

8809 (807 groups)

8809 (807 groups)

0.9748
0.0394

0.9749
0.0486

8809 (807
groups)
0.9748
0.0197

8541 (792 groups)

7905 (792 groups)

0.9760
0.0353

0.9758
0.0081

Notes: All standard errors shown are robust. One * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and *** indicates
significance at the 1% level. All explanatory variables not included in this table were not statistically significant alone with the ICMS-e dummies

With only municipal fixed effects included, many more explanatory variables were
significant. Table 5 shows the results of regressions with the ICMS-e percentage, while
Table 6 shows the results of regressions with the ICMS-e dummies. Any explanatory
variables not included in these tables were not significant when regressed with either
ICMS-e specification. Both the ICMS-e percentage and both dummies were positive and
significant in every case not shown.
In both specifications, population had a significant, positive effect on the amount
of area protected (Tables 5 and 6, regression 1). There is no clear reason as to why this is,
as many studies have linked increased population with greater demand for land, higher
land prices, and therefore increased opportunity cost to the establishment of protected
areas.171 It may be that in this case, population is really only acting as a proxy for other
variables. As discussed above, rural populations tend to have higher rates of
deforestation. A simple linear regression of the rural population percentage on the total
population shows a strong negative correlation between the two (P-value = 0.000), so
the relationship seen in these regressions may only be a reflection of fact that
municipalities with higher populations are more urbanized, and therefore have a lower
direct demand for land.
Two explanatory variables, per capita GDP and value added, measure the
economic well-being of municipalities and states. GDP per capita is measured at the
municipal level and is scaled to population sizes, so it should better show the effects of
increased personal wealth. Value added, on the other hand, was collected at the state
171

Arild Angelsen and David Kaimowitz, "Rethinking the Causes of Deforestation: Lessons from
Economic Models," The World Bank Research Observer 14, no. 1 (February, 1999), 87-89.
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level, and is a measure of the total amount of economic activity within the state.
Therefore, value added would be expected to measure the impact of increased economic
activity as a whole. Both variables had a significant positive effect on protected area, and
value added returned higher coefficients in both the continuous and dummy variable
specification of the ICMS-e (Tables 5 and 6, regressions 2 and 3). This suggests that
regional economic health is more strongly correlated with increased protected area than
individual well-being. What is most striking here is the fact that with these variables
included, the effect of the ICMS-e policy is negative and, in the case of the dummy
variable specification, not significant. A simple regression of the ICMS-e policy on either
GDP per capita or value added shows that the two are highly correlated (P-values of
0.000 in both cases), suggesting that much of the positive effect attributed to the ICMS-e
policy when it is regressed without other explanatory variables may simply be a
reflection of higher economic activity.
The relationship between wealth and environmental protection is a complicated
one which cannot possibly be fully addressed here. In many tropical countries where
deforestation is a problem, much of the clearing is done by impoverished workers
practicing slash-and-burn agriculture. Without opportunities for off-farm employment,
subsistence agriculture may be the only possible option.172 However, increased economic
activity leads to increased demand for consumer goods, so theoretically this could
increase land clearing as the demand for natural resources goes up. In the particular case
of the Amazon, history has shown that when Brazil’s economy grows, land clearing
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increases, while deforestation slows during times of recession.173 These results suggest
that the trend may have reversed in recent years, with increased wealth reducing
inefficient agricultural practices and consequently the demand for land, allowing leeway
for support of conservation measures.
One variable which was significant with only the continuous specification of the
ICMS-e is the Gini coefficient, a measure of inequality. An increased Gini coefficient
represents greater consolidation of wealth, with a Gini of 1 suggesting that a single
person owns all the wealth, while a Gini of 0 represents completely equal distribution of
resources. Brazil, which has a long history of inequality, typically has quite high Ginis
relative to other South American countries.174 In this study, the Gini coefficient, which
was collected at the state level, had a positive effect on the amount of protected area
(Table 5, regression 4). This suggests that increased inequality increases protected area, a
problematic conclusion in an area where social and environmental values often conflict.
Though the coefficient in the table is high, it’s worth noting that Gini coefficients can
only range from 0 to 1, so an interpretation of the coefficient should model increases of
no more than a few tenths to obtain a realistic interpretation. With this in mind, an
increased Gini has roughly approximate effects as increased GDP per capita or state
value added. The fact that the Gini is much less significant (not even at the 10% level in
the dummy variable specification) highlights the fact that Ginis measure a nebulous
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concept; inequality in wealth distribution has many implications, and its effects are not so
clear as simple economic growth. Another indication of the Gini’s status as a poor
predictor of protected area is its low R2 – the ICMS-e percentage and Gini coefficient
together only explain a mere 0.71% of the variation in protected area, compared to
approximately 4% for GDP per capita and 5% for value added.
Surprisingly, the number of cattle within a municipality had a strong positive
correlation with protected area, despite the fact that cattle ranching is one of the main
land uses driving up demand within the Amazon (Table 5, regression 5; Table 6,
regression 4). Given the historical trends underlying Amazonian deforestation, it is
difficult to construct an explanation for why increased ranching might have a directly
positive effect on protected area. The problem here may lie with the fact that the
number of cattle is really only a proxy for the type of ranching which is most detrimental
to conservation. Problematic ranching in the Amazon is characterized by extensive
production, overgrazing, and often land cleared for speculative purpose or to protect
against expropriation by squatters.175 High numbers of cattle, then, could be indicative of
either many large ranches, or ranches which practice efficient land use and have
concentrated numbers of cattle. Ideally, this regression would include total pasture land
to more accurately model extensive ranching, but this information was not available at
the municipal level.
Both demographic variables for rural population percentage (Table 5, regression
6; Table 6, regression 5) and indigenous population percentage (Table 5, regression 7;
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Table 6, regression 6) were significant. Rural population percentage had a strong
negative effect on protected area; the probable reasons for this have already been
discussed above. Indigenous population was not highly significant and had a low R2, but
nonetheless was positively correlated with increased protected area. This is unsurprising,
as one of the categories of protected area is indigenous lands, making the presence of
large indigenous populations clearly relevant.
For all of the following regressions I adopted a set of conventions. Because the
ICMS-e percentage in every regression done previously had a higher significance than
the dummy variable specification of ICMS-e, I used the percentage formulation
exclusively. Year dummies, if included, are not shown in the tables individually, but only
jointly. In every case, they were all positive and jointly significant at the 1% level.
For the next set of regressions, I looked more closely at some of the patterns
suggested by the above analysis. First, I examined whether controlling for rural
population percentage and population simultaneously would decrease the significance
of the population variable, which had an unexpectedly large positive effect on protected
area. I also attempted to moderate the effect of rain in the regression controlling for
both municipality and year fixed effects by adding proxy variables for the isolation of the
municipality, which I believed to be causing omitted variable bias in regressions (3) and
(4) of Table 4. Specifically, I included the rural population percentage, which tends to
increase in more remote areas, and the total population, which is much lower in areas in
the far west of the Amazon, where rainfall is highest. These results are shown in Table 7.
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Table 7. Controlling for omitted variable bias: ICMS-e percentage and other explanatory
variables regressed on log-transformed area protected
Dependent variable: ln(Area protected)
Explanatory variable
(1)
ICMS-e percentage
0.015*** [0.012]
ln(population)
0.596*** [0.152]
rural population percentage –0.038*** [0.009]
ln(rain)
year dummy variables
Number of observations
7905 (792 groups)
Rho
0.9748
2
Within R
0.0420

(2)
–0.035*** [0.015]
0.226*** [0.146]
–0.020*** [0.009]
7.854*** [4.612]
included
7905 (792 groups)
0.9730
0.0602

Notes: All standard errors shown are robust. The year 1999 is omitted from regression (2), and all
year dummies were jointly significant at the 1% level. One * indicates significance at the 10%
level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, *** indicates significance at the 1% level.

Regression (1) shows that even when rural population is controlled for, the total
municipal population is still significant at the 1% level. As suspected, the coefficient on
poopulation is reduced with the inclusion of the rural population percentage, but it still
has a large positive effect on protected area. This rejects my previous hypothesis that
population was only positively significant because it is correlated with increased
urbanization, which tends to decrease the direct demand for land. Instead, it appears
that either population truly does have a positive impact on the amount of protected
area, or there are still other omitted variables which are correlated with population,
artificially increasing its coefficient. Notably, the ICMS-e policy is not significant in
regression (1), suggesting that it has only a minor influence on protected areas
compared to demographic variables.
Attempting to control for omitted variables correlated with the average annual
rainfall was not successful; rain still has an implausibly large coefficient, though it is much
less significant, widening its confidence interval even further (regression 2). This
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regression supports the conclusion that rain is a direct deterrent to agricultural
production, decreasing the demand for land and therefore the opportunity cost of
establishing protected areas.176 However, the proxy variables I included were not
particularly accurate proxies. A better choice would be to use some measure of spatial
distance either N-S or E-W, which would directly control for spatial effects. Alternatively,
Chomitz and Thomas controlled for isolation from human settlements by including
variables indicating whether an area was within a buffer zone around major cities and
roads.177 Inclusion of something along these lines would help to determine if rain itself
was deterring alternative land uses, if there was spatial correlation in the data, or if it is
only distance from major settlements which decreases the demand for land.
For the final set of regressions, I first ran a model of all the variables which I
expected to be the most important determinants of protected area from the review of
existing literature, both with and without year fixed effects. The first variable included
was value added, as historical patterns of land use in the Amazon show that
macroeconomic variables have a strong role to play.178 In addition, value added was
highly significant when regressed with either ICMS-e specification, suggesting it has a
large impact on my dataset.
The next two variables included were the area of temporary agriculture and
number of cattle. Both of these variables were lagged by one period and compared to
the results using the non-lagged coefficient (Table 8, regressions 1-3). The model with
176
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the higher within R2 is taken to be the one with the strongest explanatory power and was
combined with the remaining explanatory variables. There were several reasons why it
might make sense to include these lagged variables. First, it is important to keep in mind
that the temporary agriculture variable primarily represents soybean farms. Literature
suggests that while soybean farming does not have an immediate direct effect on land
use, the roads which are built to new farms under pressure from the soybean lobby bring
settlers, loggers, and others who increase the demand for land.179 Therefore, the biggest
effect of temporary agriculture in determining the demand for land will not necessarily
be felt immediately. Although there is not quite as clear a reason to use the lagged value
for cattle as with temporary agriculture, this formulation is consistent with Andersen and
Reis’ findings regarding the determinants of demand for land in the rural Amazon.180
The last two variables included in this regression were demographic: the rural
population percentage and the indigenous population percentage. Both these variables
had significant effects when regressed on protected area with only the ICMS-e
percentage (Table 4, regressions 1 and 2; Table 5, regressions 6 and 7; Table 6,
regressions 5 and 6). Empirical studies suggest that the rural population is a key
determinant of land use in the Amazon,181 and if the rural population percentage is
viewed as a proxy for such variables as the activity of rural workers’ groups, then it would
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likely have an enormous effect on the demand for land uses other than protected area.182
The indigenous population percentage was also included because of the obvious effect it
might be expected to have on increasing the amount of indigenous land within a
municipality, and because the debate over the role or indigenous people in preventing
deforestation makes it an interesting variable to consider.183
These regressions were performed both with and without year fixed effects.
Finally, I ran a regression with year fixed effect not including value added. I did this
because, when value added was regressed with the ICMS-e percentage alone, it caused
the coefficient on the ICMS-e percentage to be negative. I wanted to test whether
removing the effects of value added caused the ICMS-e percentage to be positive when
multiple other explanatory variables were included. The results are shown in Table 8.
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Table 8. ICMS-e percentage and other explanatory variables suggested to be significant from literature review regressed on logtransformed area protected
Dependent variable: ln(Area protected)
Explanatory variable

no lagged

temporary agriculture

variables

lagged

(1)

(2)

cattle lagged
(3)

with year

without value

dummies

added

(4)

(5)

–0.041***

[0.014]

–0.042***

[0.014]

–0.042***

[0.014]

–0.033***

[0.013]

ln(value added)

0.314***

[0.059]

0.313***

[0.058]

0.319***

[0.061]

–0.291***

[0.211]

ln(temporary agriculture)

0.007***

[0.027]

0.008***

[0.027]

ICMS-e percentage

ln(temporary
agriculture)t-1
ln(cattle)

0.053***

[0.053]

indigenous population
percent

[0.027]

0.014***

[0.028]

0.015***

[0.028]

0.052***

[0.053]

0.043***

[0.053]

0.041***

[0.053]

0.031***

[0.048]

–0.018***

[0.009]

–0.018***

[0.009]

–0.019***

[0.009]

–0.018***

[0.009]

–0.018***

[0.009]

0.023***

[0.024]

0.023***

[0.024]

0.023***

[0.024]

0.020***

[0.024]

0.021***

[0.024]

year dummy variables
Number of observations
Rho
Within R

2

[0.014]

0.017***

ln(cattle)t-1
rural population percent

–0.041***

included

included

7905 (792 groups)

7905 (792 groups)

7905 (792 groups)

7905 (792 groups)

7905 (792 groups)

0.9775

0.9775

0.9775

0.9777

0.9776

0.0502

0.0504

0.0499

0.0539

0.0536

Notes: All standard errors shown are robust. The year 2000 is omitted from regressions (4) and (5), and all year dummies were jointly significant at the
1% level. One * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and *** indicates significance at the 1% level.

Lagging temporary agriculture improved the model fit, while lagging the number
of cattle did not (Table 8, regressions 1-3). This aligns with the suggestion that lagged
temporary agriculture represents the indirect effects of soybean farming. Only value
added and the rural population percent were significant, and each had the same signs in
this regression as it did in previous ones. Including dummies to control for year fixed
effects reduces the significance of the rural population and makes the value added not
significant (regression 4). Removing it from the equation, however, does not change the
signs or the significance of any of the variables (regression 5).
In every single regression, the ICMS-e has a significant negative effect on the
area protected, with a 1 percentage point increase in the ICMS-e correlated with a
decrease in the amount of protected area by 3.33-4.23%. Because these models have
some of the best goodness of fit of all tested models, and because the included variables
are those which were suggested to be positive in the literature review, the conclusion of
this analysis, is that, when year and municipality fixed-effects are controlled for, ICMS-e
policies actually have a negative effect on the establishment of new protected areas. This
is a surprising conclusion, and it is not clear what could be driving this. Some of the
problem might lie in the fact that the sample size was relatively small, with not a large
amount of variation in the ICMS-policies at the municipal level, as they were determined
only at the state level. Perhaps inclusion of the rest of the states of Brazil would yield
significant results.
It is also interesting to note that when either year fixed-effects or some measure
of economic well-being are not included, the ICMS-e policies tend to have positive
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coefficients. This suggests that perhaps the reason that the ICMS-e appears negative in
so many of these regressions is that it is strongly correlated with these variables. In fact,
this is clearly true – more states had ICMS-e policies over time, and there was a strong
positive relationship between ICMS-e and both value added and GDP. Again, inclusion of
a greater sample size might help to disentangle the effects of these variables, giving a
more accurate picture of how the ICMS-e truly affected the establishment of new
protected areas.
A few important things to note in all of the above regressions are the high rho
values and the relatively low R2. The high rhos (above 0.96 for every regression) suggest
that the panel dataset explains a huge percentage of the variation in the error term, as
the variation across municipalities was a major determinant of protected area. This
means that there is little variation remaining to be attributed to the included explanatory
variables, a fact which is reflected in the low R2. High rho values are not inherently
problematic; in fact, this strongly supports the use of the fixed-effects model, as
municipality fixed effects had an enormous influence. However, it does mean that if there
are sampling errors or other problems in the data, these effects may be magnified, as
their influence will be relatively large in comparison to the variation not explained by
municipality-level fixed effects. There is not a clear way to stop this from occurring,
except to minimize the errors in the data by controlling for omitted variables and
including proxies or instrumental variables as needed.
It is worth noting that some of the assumption made regarding the data may
have been incorrect, leading to biases in the calculated effects. For instance, I did not
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have year-level data on rural or indigenous population percentages, so I assumed a
linear transformation between the years 2000 and 2010. While this could have been true,
there is no way to know if there were large fluctuations in the rural or indigenous
population during this time period which are not reflected in the data. In addition, the
quality of some of the GIS data is not perfect; indigenous lands and protected areas do
not always have well-defined borders. Issues with the dependent variable’s reliability
could significantly bias the results of the entire study. Ground-truthing of calculated
values would be an invaluable tool to prevent this from occurring.
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CHAPTER V. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
This study suggests that, by themselves, ICMS-e policies have a positive impact
on the establishment of protected areas. However, when other variables are controlled
for, the significance of the ICMS-e policy declines, and, particularly when either wealth
measurements or fixed effects of both municipalities and years are included, the ICMS-e
policy actually has a negative impact on the establishment of protected areas. The
reasons for this relationship are not clear. It could be caused by the fact that the sample
size was too small and had limited variation; with only the states of the Legal Amazon to
consider, there were not significant enough differences to truly capture the impact of the
ICMS-e. Further studies should investigate a broader area, including not just the Legal
Amazon, but also the other states of Brazil. Perhaps with this larger sample size and
greater variation, the true effects of the ICMS-e could be teased out of the data.
A perhaps more likely explanation is that even if the ICMS-e has any positive
impact on the creation of new protected areas, it is a minimal one compared to the
effects of problematic policies which have plagued the Amazon for the last sixty years.
The continued significant negative effect of increased rural population on protected area
throughout all the simulations points to the fact that the presence of large numbers of
impoverished and generally landless farmers will overshadow any positive outcomes
from policies intended to increase protected areas and decrease deforestation. Poor land
tenure policies, a problematic distribution of land, and high agricultural pressures will
continue to be the main drivers Amazonian deforestation unless serious changes occur.
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Therefore, the true conclusion of this study is not a strong statement about the
ICMS-e, but rather a cautionary tale regarding alternative forces which have led to the
massive increases in deforestation seen in the past twenty years. Policies involving
squatters should be standardized across the area to increase land tenure and prevent
unnecessary clearing.184 In addition, powerful agricultural interests should not be
subsidized and supported with government-built infrastructure. While there is a need to
balance economic devilment in this impoverished region, assisting large cattle and
soybean farmers does not accomplish this goal and has significant environmental
impacts.185 Sustainable use protected areas are a better alternative, and one that actually
has relatively strong support at the local level in Brazil.
Other significant variables in increasing the amount of protected area included
increased average annual rainfall. This effect may be a legitimate one, with increased
rainfall leading to lower demand for land for agricultural purposes and therefore a lower
opportunity cost of establishing protected areas.186 However, it could also be that
increased rainfall is related to a spatial autocorrelation, which was not controlled for in
this study. Alternatively, the effect of rainfall may be correlated with increased distance
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to human settlements, thereby biasing the coefficient on the rainfall variable upward.
Controlling for either of these factors would help to demonstrate whether the effect of
rainfall truly exists.
As international pressure on the Brazilian government continues, the fate of the
Amazon as a protector of biodiversity and a strong tool for carbon sequestration hangs
in the balance. Protected areas are an important part of this equation, but without
improved monitoring and maintenance, they will not serve much purpose. Though it was
not represented in my regressions, the ICMS-e policies which are likely to have the most
substantial impact are those which provide administrative support for maintaining
protected areas and which increase the institutional capacity of municipalities. Anecdotal
reports from states which have implemented ICMS-e laws for more than 10 years show
that one of the main positive impacts of the ICMS-e is a greater support and concern for
protected areas by municipalities. Increased local acceptance of protected areas is a key
goal in long-term conservation.187 In this case, even if the ICMS-e has no direct impact
on the size of protected areas, it can still play an important role.
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